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EVERYBODY MUST OBEY, ABIDE BY AND FOLLOW THE LAW

ALL KILLINGS AND CAUSING OF DEATH AND INJURY TO INNOCENT 

NON-COMBATANTS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD ARE CONDEMNED 

A POSTERIORI AND A PRIORI, REGARDLESS OF WHO THE VICTIMS ARE

If you read stuff written by the ABSOLUTELY CRAZED CONTINUALLY SELF-LOBOTOMISING ULTRA-LOONY MAD SATIRICAL LITERARY PERSONA (born c. 599, 699, 799, 899 or 999 A.D. in Hellenic Eastern Rome) WITHOUT HAVING READ AND STUDIED AND UNDERSTOOD ALL OF P.K.'s CORE TEXTS FIRST (AND AT THE RATE I'M CURRENTLY GOING, THAT WON'T BE POSSIBLE BEFORE c. 2052 (UNLESS YOU READ GERMAN OR GREEK) IF I MAKE IT THAT FAR IN AN ABLE-BODIED STATE (HIGHLY UNLIKELY, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE)), THEN YOU ARE DOING WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN TOLD NOT TO DO, AND YOU ARE BEING RATHER NAUGHTY - TO SAY THE LEAST. I FIND, THOUGH, THAT NO-ONE EVER LISTENS TO ME, SO THEREFORE, I MUST BE WRONG. I MUST BE

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THE LITERARY-SATIRICAL PERSONA COMMENTING ON THIS PAGE AND THROUGHOUT THIS SITE IS INSANE. NO WRITER, THINKER OR AUTHOR REFERRED TO HERE HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH ANY KIND OF DISCRIMINATION, BIGOTRY, RACISM OR CHAUVINISM WHATSOEVER. EVERY THINKER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN - AND ONLY FOR THEIR OWN - WORDS. THE PERSONA COMMENTING ON THIS PAGE AND THROUGHOUT THIS SITE WAS BORN BETWEEN 599A.D. AND 999A.D. AND HAS GONE TOTALLY INSANE. DON'T PAY ATTENTION TO HIS COMMENTS. THINK, AND WORK "IT" OUT, FOR YOURSELVES.






Title Pages and Table of Contents





Chapter IV




The Political and Man, Chapter IV, Section 1A: The inner mechanism of the social relation relates to mental acts (isolated in terms of theory and as a simplifying abstraction) necessary for a social relation to take place against the background of a pre-existing society (its processes of socialisation etc.), and involves understanding the Other has subjectivity, as well as putting oneself in the Other’s situation or position. Because of our social-ontological orientation, psychologism – as in the case of the spectrum of the social relation – is avoided at all costs, and we find that the inner mechanism of the social relation operates across the whole of the friend-foe spectrum and the said spectrum’s continuum, regardless of “positive or negative” characteristics of individuals. We are concerned with the mechanism as a form of the social relation applying to all individuals in all situations, and always interrelating with the spectrum of the social relation, and not with the psychological content in every particular instance, which might actually be of interest to (social) psychologists, historians and sociologists. The outer/external mechanism, involving external acts (including the internal acts) will be examined in detail in the second half of this chapter.   

Chapter IV, Section 1Ba delves into the fundamental characteristics of the Ego/I, the Other (and the Other’s imponderability), and subjectivity. The importance of society pre-existing individuals is highlighted in order to reiterate the theoretical context for social-ontological investigation. Equally important is the sharp demarcation between humans and non-human animals, of which all humans qua humans (generally) have a firm sense. There’s a very telling Freeman-Slave reference to Plato, followed by a “to be or not to be” explanation tying in with a fundamental characteristic of human subjectivity. It follows, that all humans have a sense of I (Ego) and Other (Alter) and subjectivity involved on both sides. Imponderability and incalculability, as well as changeability, all loom large in human social relations, and make the mechanism of the social relation constantly interact and intersect with the spectrum of the social relation and its Friend-Foe continuum. Related to the above is also a lack of (absolute) control – one cannot necessarily always control either the thoughts or the actions of the Other and or Others as much and as deeply as one might want to, even if one explains such lack of control (in concealing one’s own power claims and or actual power) as being the result of “irrationalism” or “blind drives/passions” etc.. The relative lack of (mobile) resistance of an inanimate object is contrasted to the always present potential of a human subject to either kill another human and or kill himself. Death, therefore, is key. Any subjectivity can potentially occupy any place along the continuum of the spectrum of the (Friend-Foe) social relation, and because there can never be a state of continual “total” control, there is never ANY possibility of “eternal peace” or “perfect harmony”. Interpretation cannot provide any definite and absolute certainty regarding the Other. The Other always retains its potential (at least) imponderability, incalculability and unpredictability. Of course, societies always provide – to varying degrees and in many various ways – institutions and or conventions which lessen the general aspect of imponderability and uncontrollability, yet such institutions and conventions can never efface conflict and or (potential) violence from society forever. The commonly held views, maxims, proverbs etc. of ordinary (primitive, etc./et al.) peoples across all cultures and known eras attest to the lack of total, permanent foreseeability and controllability of the Other. Ritual and magic in “primitive” tribes relate to the notion of bringing or trying to bring the uncontrollable under control. With a reference to Ortega y Gasset, mention is made of “the complete Other” who is not yet Friend or Foe, but does (or can) represent potential danger. Individuals constantly display a sense that the Other has similar formal capacities as to the mechanism of the social relation, but is always more than capable of acting unpredictably and or contrarily to the Ego’s own wishes etc.. Distance and proximity in the social relation relate to the taking on and assumption of roles, which will be investigated later in this chapter. General knowledge about all humans taking on roles and having subjectivity etc., guarantees no necessary knowledge about what another subjectivity will do in a concrete situation. Cf. La Rochefoucauld. Of course, a great deal of human behaviour and action is ponderable and foreseeable, because just as humans cannot live in a state of only conflict, so too, they cannot know absolutely nothing about what all other people will do next, etc.. Just as all normality has exceptions, so too, all societal contexts will include imponderability (Max Weber re: sociologically amorphous power and institutionally founded authority as dominance). Both ponderability and imponderability interrelate with BOTH friendship and enmity, though friendship must be wanted by both sides, which is not the case re: enmity. Joruba-tribe: peace is the father of friendship, as peace can exist not just between friends, but also between foes etc.. Discussion then follows regarding system and environment, ponderability-normality, Schütz, Parsons, ethnomethodology etc.. In particular, in regard to Schütz (and his with-world and environment distinction, etc.), there seems to be a theoretical tendency towards atomisation and general harmlessness without conflict etc. (= ideologically ideal for “multiculturalism” and the “concealment” of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystallisations of power. P.K., of course, does NOT expressly state this, but unless I’m imagining things, this seems to be the general tone of the argumentation). In any event, P.K. goes on to point out that compulsion and conflict never go permanently away, and the positing of “ideal circumstances” has nothing to do with reality. Subjectivity and a capacity to act not as expected are always present, as is the Other’s capability at rejecting and resisting. Parsons and G. H. Mead fell into similar theoretical traps as Schütz. Norms, rules, laws etc. in societies, can never remove the imponderability and incalculability always potentially present in subjectivity and its action. P.K. refers to the keeping to forms and the keeping up of appearances etc. as long as NOTHING VITAL as to identity (and power) is at stake. Norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground, as well as a battlefield. Even common meaning contexts (which are subject to varying interpretations, anyway) e.g. re: culture and language, guarantee no constant ponderability. Robbers and blackmailers will do their crimes, but they still have recourse to social norms, as in e.g. a mutually understood language. Common Sense is closer to the very varied and rich-in-situations reality than many a phenomenologist of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologist (P.K. does not say it, but I say it: in the 20th century = GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY = Jews in esp. the USA, France and England). Reference is made to the constant anxiety-like potentiality of existence, in which the Ego’s status and identity can always be potentially challenged etc.. The subjectivity of the Other is perceived not merely as acting (i.e. active), but also as perceiving (i.e. perceptive), whereby perception here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other, to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. It’s not, though, enough to refer to the Other’s dispositions to secure a permanent ponderability, which simply cannot be secured in reality (as a matter of social reality). P.K. master class time re: causality:

“Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, the subject’s (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for, and to take into account, the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in which the Other must unfold and develop his activity. In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. ... Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity as subjectivity par excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is, as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).”

Further discussion ensues as regards intentions and subjectivity and the overall objective factual situation, including the I (ego) acting in a friendly manner to someone who might want to do the I (ego) harm, because of specific considerations and interests, of which the I (ego) is cognizant, and not necessarily the Other. Reference to Nietzsche and his oversimplification re: intentions, subjectively meant and objective meaning. + The I (ego) tends to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) by means of intentions, and makes its own act(ion)s, especially act(ion)s unpleasant to the Other, more likely, plausible by means of circumstances. Whatever the case may be, subjectivity (and its always potential imponderability, even though much of it is and can be ponderable) is always prominent in human, social relations.




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