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EVERYBODY MUST OBEY, ABIDE BY AND FOLLOW THE LAW

ALL KILLINGS AND CAUSING OF DEATH AND INJURY TO INNOCENT 

NON-COMBATANTS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD ARE CONDEMNED 

A POSTERIORI AND A PRIORI, REGARDLESS OF WHO THE VICTIMS ARE

If you read stuff written by the ABSOLUTELY CRAZED CONTINUALLY SELF-LOBOTOMISING ULTRA-LOONY MAD SATIRICAL LITERARY PERSONA (born c. 599, 699, 799, 899 or 999 A.D. in Hellenic Eastern Rome) WITHOUT HAVING READ AND STUDIED AND UNDERSTOOD ALL OF P.K.'s CORE TEXTS FIRST (AND AT THE RATE I'M CURRENTLY GOING, THAT WON'T BE POSSIBLE BEFORE c. 2052 (UNLESS YOU READ GERMAN OR GREEK) IF I MAKE IT THAT FAR IN AN ABLE-BODIED STATE (HIGHLY UNLIKELY, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE)), THEN YOU ARE DOING WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN TOLD NOT TO DO, AND YOU ARE BEING RATHER NAUGHTY - TO SAY THE LEAST. I FIND, THOUGH, THAT NO-ONE EVER LISTENS TO ME, SO THEREFORE, I MUST BE WRONG. I MUST BE

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Title Pages and Table of Contents





Chapter IV




The Political and Man, Chapter IV, Section 1A: The inner mechanism of the social relation relates to mental acts (isolated in terms of theory and as a simplifying abstraction) necessary for a social relation to take place against the background of a pre-existing society (its processes of socialisation etc.), and involves understanding the Other has subjectivity, as well as putting oneself in the Other’s situation or position. Because of our social-ontological orientation, psychologism – as in the case of the spectrum of the social relation – is avoided at all costs, and we find that the inner mechanism of the social relation operates across the whole of the friend-foe spectrum and the said spectrum’s continuum, regardless of “positive or negative” characteristics of individuals. We are concerned with the mechanism as a form of the social relation applying to all individuals in all situations, and always interrelating with the spectrum of the social relation, and not with the psychological content in every particular instance, which might actually be of interest to (social) psychologists, historians and sociologists. The outer/external mechanism, involving external acts (including the internal acts) will be examined in detail in the second half of this chapter.   

Chapter IV, Section 1Ba delves into the fundamental characteristics of the Ego/I, the Other (and the Other’s imponderability), and subjectivity. The importance of society pre-existing individuals is highlighted in order to reiterate the theoretical context for social-ontological investigation. Equally important is the sharp demarcation between humans and non-human animals, of which all humans qua humans (generally) have a firm sense. There’s a very telling Freeman-Slave reference to Plato, followed by a “to be or not to be” explanation tying in with a fundamental characteristic of human subjectivity. It follows, that all humans have a sense of I (Ego) and Other (Alter) and subjectivity involved on both sides. Imponderability and incalculability, as well as changeability, all loom large in human social relations, and make the mechanism of the social relation constantly interact and intersect with the spectrum of the social relation and its Friend-Foe continuum. Related to the above is also a lack of (absolute) control – one cannot necessarily always control either the thoughts or the actions of the Other and or Others as much and as deeply as one might want to, even if one explains such lack of control (in concealing one’s own power claims and or actual power) as being the result of “irrationalism” or “blind drives/passions” etc.. The relative lack of (mobile) resistance of an inanimate object is contrasted to the always present potential of a human subject to either kill another human and or kill himself. Death, therefore, is key. Any subjectivity can potentially occupy any place along the continuum of the spectrum of the (Friend-Foe) social relation, and because there can never be a state of continual “total” control, there is never ANY possibility of “eternal peace” or “perfect harmony”. Interpretation cannot provide any definite and absolute certainty regarding the Other. The Other always retains its potential (at least) imponderability, incalculability and unpredictability. Of course, societies always provide – to varying degrees and in many various ways – institutions and or conventions which lessen the general aspect of imponderability and uncontrollability, yet such institutions and conventions can never efface conflict and or (potential) violence from society forever. The commonly held views, maxims, proverbs etc. of ordinary (primitive, etc./et al.) peoples across all cultures and known eras attest to the lack of total, permanent foreseeability and controllability of the Other. Ritual and magic in “primitive” tribes relate to the notion of bringing or trying to bring the uncontrollable under control. With a reference to Ortega y Gasset, mention is made of “the complete Other” who is not yet Friend or Foe, but does (or can) represent potential danger. Individuals constantly display a sense that the Other has similar formal capacities as to the mechanism of the social relation, but is always more than capable of acting unpredictably and or contrarily to the Ego’s own wishes etc.. Distance and proximity in the social relation relate to the taking on and assumption of roles, which will be investigated later in this chapter. General knowledge about all humans taking on roles and having subjectivity etc., guarantees no necessary knowledge about what another subjectivity will do in a concrete situation. Cf. La Rochefoucauld. Of course, a great deal of human behaviour and action is ponderable and foreseeable, because just as humans cannot live in a state of only conflict, so too, they cannot know absolutely nothing about what all other people will do next, etc.. Just as all normality has exceptions, so too, all societal contexts will include imponderability (Max Weber re: sociologically amorphous power and institutionally founded authority as dominance). Both ponderability and imponderability interrelate with BOTH friendship and enmity, though friendship must be wanted by both sides, which is not the case re: enmity. Joruba-tribe: peace is the father of friendship, as peace can exist not just between friends, but also between foes etc.. Discussion then follows regarding system and environment, ponderability-normality, Schütz, Parsons, ethnomethodology etc.. In particular, in regard to Schütz (and his with-world and environment distinction, etc.), there seems to be a theoretical tendency towards atomisation and general harmlessness without conflict etc. (= ideologically ideal for “multiculturalism” and the “concealment” of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystallisations of power. P.K., of course, does NOT expressly state this, but unless I’m imagining things, this seems to be the general tone of the argumentation). In any event, P.K. goes on to point out that compulsion and conflict never go permanently away, and the positing of “ideal circumstances” has nothing to do with reality. Subjectivity and a capacity to act not as expected are always present, as is the Other’s capability at rejecting and resisting. Parsons and G. H. Mead fell into similar theoretical traps as Schütz. Norms, rules, laws etc. in societies, can never remove the imponderability and incalculability always potentially present in subjectivity and its action. P.K. refers to the keeping to forms and the keeping up of appearances etc. as long as NOTHING VITAL as to identity (and power) is at stake. Norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground, as well as a battlefield. Even common meaning contexts (which are subject to varying interpretations, anyway) e.g. re: culture and language, guarantee no constant ponderability. Robbers and blackmailers will do their crimes, but they still have recourse to social norms, as in e.g. a mutually understood language. Common Sense is closer to the very varied and rich-in-situations reality than many a phenomenologist of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologist (P.K. does not say it, but I say it: in the 20th century = GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY = Jews in esp. the USA, France and England). Reference is made to the constant anxiety-like potentiality of existence, in which the Ego’s status and identity can always be potentially challenged etc.. The subjectivity of the Other is perceived not merely as acting (i.e. active), but also as perceiving (i.e. perceptive), whereby perception here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other, to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. It’s not, though, enough to refer to the Other’s dispositions to secure a permanent ponderability, which simply cannot be secured in reality (as a matter of social reality). P.K. master class time re: causality:

“Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, the subject’s (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for, and to take into account, the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in which the Other must unfold and develop his activity. In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. ... Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity as subjectivity par excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is, as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).”

Further discussion ensues as regards intentions and subjectivity and the overall objective factual situation, including the I (ego) acting in a friendly manner to someone who might want to do the I (ego) harm, because of specific considerations and interests, of which the I (ego) is cognizant, and not necessarily the Other. Reference to Nietzsche and his oversimplification re: intentions, subjectively meant and objective meaning. + The I (ego) tends to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) by means of intentions, and makes its own act(ion)s, especially act(ion)s unpleasant to the Other, more likely, plausible by means of circumstances. Whatever the case may be, subjectivity (and its always potential imponderability, even though much of it is and can be ponderable) is always prominent in human, social relations.

Section 1B(b) of Chapter IV, starts off by reminding us that just as ponderability and imponderability can relate to both friendship and enmity in accordance with each and every respective situation, so too alienness/unfamiliarity and familiarity have no necessary relationship with either friendship or enmity. Hence, if identity (and its vital interests) are not put at risk, the alien or strange (and uncanny, weird, eerie or mysterious), including any attendant relativisation of one’s own values, not only is not viewed as inimical, it can even be worshipped, depending, again, on the concrete situation. Furthermore, the alien/strange does not at all have to come “from without” but could be someone from a particular group who does not “conform” in some kind of noticeable and or “offensive/abnormal” way. P.K. refers to the fact that extreme conflict such as civil wars and family vendettas have existed when the cultural and or other affinity is relatively close. In other words, strangeness or alienness does not carry with it any inherent “quality” of conflict etc. which does not or cannot exist in circumstances of relative familiarity and or similarity. “Prejudice”, being a kind of typification, i.e. rendering into types, can NEVER be eliminated (simply because humans qua humans always (have the capacity to) think in terms of categories and groups, as well as individuals, and make distinctions,... regardless of how those distinctions are geared by favouring x and prejudicing y,... etc. [[SO, “fighting” one form of “racism and supremacy” simply promotes another form of “racism and supremacy”, including situations when ABSOLUTELY FILTHY AND DISGUSTING ANIMAL-RAT/RODENT-LIKE GROUPS (AS A SUBJECTIVE MATTER OF TASTE) IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES “ENJOY” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE FORMS OF POWER AND WEALTH AT ELITE LEVEL, INCLUDING THROUGH PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING AND HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT IN BANKING, HIGH FINANCE, CORPORATIONS, ETC.]]). Notwithstanding any initial tension (rather than surprise in the case of someone familiar taking up a different position in the spectrum of the social relation), once the alien is active in a social relation with someone, the said alien will take up a position in the spectrum of the social relation just like any familiar person. Everyone, thus, can become “estranged and alienated”, or the other way around, regardless of whether people were initially familiar or alien to others. There is reference to Husserl and “a core of the state of knowing and familiarity” in regard to even the most alien and strange, whereas even the most familiar can or does contain an element of alienness. What is always KEY is THE SOCIAL REALTION AND IDENTITY (POWER), and where people stand within the social relation between one another. So, non-Greeks were NOT barbarians to Greeks in Homer, but were most definitely in the 5th century... Both idealisation and daemonisation (worship of the alien and or stranger, and killing the alien/stranger) are always possible, as is the whole gamut of possible social relations. Very illustrative is Levine’s schematisation: if a friendly relation(ship) towards the alien/foreigner/stranger unfolds or develops, then he becomes in the case of a visit, like a guest; in the case of a temporary stay, like a resident; and in the case of a lasting, i.e. permanent, stay, like a newly accepted member of the community; if, however, the relation(ship) turns into something inimical, then one treats the stranger/alien, in the first case, like an intruder/interloper/penetrator/infiltrator/invader; in the second case, like an internal foe; and in the third case, like a pariah or outcast. The alien can show tremendous zeal to confirm in a new society, or can go the opposite way and display tremendous aggressivity to the host population, by exploiting any freedoms offered to him as a kind of release valve or vent. [[I’ve lived all this through personal experience, but of course, never with physical violence or being needlessly rude to anyone (there's no point and it's against the law...) (AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!):]] The inimical pole of the social relation is, therefore, here occupied when the alien/stranger, in regard to all points, stresses the differences between himself and the new surroundings or environment; the friendly pole of the social relation is occupied when the alien/stranger wants to desperately and absolutely be assimilated, in relation to which he may express the same inability to really understand foreign (alien or strange) mores and ways of thinking, both in regard to exaggerated and overdone censure and reproach, or in regard to exaggerated and overdone praise. In between (the said two exaggerated and overdone extremes), there are stances like for instance outer (external) adaptation during inner (internal) distancing etc.. The discussion now turns to trust and mistrust, and it is explained how whilst trust requires at the very least a certain familiarity, overall, both trust and mistrust can arise in view of both the relatively familiar and the relatively unfamiliar. KEY AGAIN IS ALWAYS THE SOCIAL RELATION AND THE SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN IT. Trust is always particular (i.e. a part or a portion as opposed to the whole), it relates to certain aspects of social life, certain subjects or certain properties and qualities of these subjects, which, by the way, means that trust is regularly accompanied by mistrust against other aspects of social life, against other subjects, or against other properties and qualities of these subjects. Given that societal norms and rules are never totally adhered to by everyone, and in fact can be breached regularly by many people, depending on the situation, trust cannot be a phenomenon characterising the whole of society, but must take place in regard to specific, concrete, in part, particular, individual circumstances and situations. Trust – closely connected to “expectations” (whose content can vary from person to person), aims, intentions,... – is basically nothing other than an ultimate or final irreducible statement about ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability): absolute trust applies to the absolutely ponderable (calculable); imponderability (incalculability) is synonymous and tantamount to untrustworthiness and unreliability. Trust can exist in all kinds of relations including between criminals, and does not have to exist for there to be an expectation. Individual and collective life would not be possible (it would become paralysed) if everyone trusted everyone absolutely. Trust does not and cannot constitute an original magnitude, but presupposes a certain shaping and formation of the social relation, i.e. in concrete cases there can be fixed, on-going trust between people, but not to the extent that the inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation can be eliminated. Whoever gives or bestows trust, confirms the person being given trust’s identity, and the return or reciprocation of trust functions as the recognition for this recognition. Neither does trust connect or link the totality of the societal extent, scope or reference, nor does trust, at a certain moment, connect all members of society with all members of this same society. Social-ontologically, of interest is the ascertainment that existing trust indeed promotes and reinforces friendship and co-operation, but by no means suffices to guarantee friendship and co-operation’s smooth course; in very many cases, in fact, precisely this course constitutes the precondition and prerequisite for the emergence of trust. At the overall societal level, trust develops its effect not in chemical purity, but in its – from case to case – mix and blend of heterogeneous elements in different doses. The discussion proceeds to impersonal “rational mistrust” in particular as regards institutions and very importantly, FEAR. I.e., by keeping people afraid of sanctions, punishments etc., society is aided in terms of social disciplining and reducing imponderabilities by people “rationally mistrusting” such institutions, etc.. In this sense, the Joruba are right: peace, that is, an institutionally fairly well-ordered state of affairs, not, for instance, trust, is the father of friendship. Of course, there are also cases where personal trust bypassing the “rational mistrust” re: fear and institutions etc. plays a role (P.K. refers to Albanians, and not to Satanists, but he could have... AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!). Reality has proved time and time again that Emerson’s “Trust men and they will be true to you”, does not hold for everyone all of the time in the real world of the social relation. Yet, in such moral stances, the ideal self-understanding of society is expressed and carries on living, of which society has unconditional need in order to be able to function as a society. Examples from Democritus, Seneca and Shakespeare show an awareness that trust on its own is hardly sufficient for honesty or sincere relations between all people; that trust is the opposite of fear and vice versa, etc.. There can be no generalised trust. The dangerous and risky imponderability (incalculability) of the Other is the ultimate source of, in practice, offered and shown “rational mistrust”. Chamfort = wisdom goes with fear. Similarly, the Ashanti. In Western mass democracies, “trust”, the concept, at last became a major part of theory, connected to communication, “rationality”, pluralism and the associated [[particularly ZIO-Satanic, I say, not P.K.]] sentimentalisation permeating Western societies. The functionalist Simmel made the error of tying trust into supposedly enhanced/increasing societal objectification and ponderability from a “community” vs. “society” perspective, with modern “society” providing “objectification” tying into enhanced trust and “reliability” making any need for “personal” relationships superfluous (and this, from a JOO!!! Simmel must have been a VERY NON-JOO, JOO!!!). The reality is that notions of the objective and the personal have been around since ancient times (Socrates/Plato) and magicians/“primitive peoples”. Luhmann-like systems theory positions also do not prove that society can reach a level where trust (as opposed to mistrust) can eliminate conflict etc.. It becomes obvious, therefore, that what counts are the social relation and constellations/correlations of power, and not e.g. “thoughtlessness and frivolity” in relation to trust and mistrust. P.K. gives some relevant examples of how power relations affect trust, ending with the example of (nearly) all people locking their front door and taking the key with them when they leave their home.

[[SO, what is paramount from a strictly scientific-descriptive point of view, is that society has a relative balance/equilibrium between the material conditions of living for the masses (access to food, shelter, goods, health, jobs, employment, income etc.) as they relate to the ideological-aesthetical acceptance of power structures and institutions, hierarchies, dominant ideology, etc., rather than the racial and or cultural make up of a society per se. When, however, such a balance or equilibrium becomes relatively unhinged by e.g. masses of anomic-ape behaviour or by a non-acceptance at elite and or lower levels of the hierarchies of distributions of forms of power and wealth etc., then the SHIT CAN POTENTIALLY HIT THE FAN, and that could mean the (increased, enhanced, radicalised, etc.) entry of racial and or cultural matters into the politics within the political and the social. Neither relative “monoculturalism”, nor relative “multiculturalism” is – per se and as such and inherently – a “Strength” or a “Weakness”. It depends. As do aesthetical preferences, depend...]]         

Chapter IV, Section 1Ca amounts to a brief historical-theoretical overview of the adoption of perspectives in social theory. Readers are reminded of the disconnecting of sociology from the philosophy of history in the late 19th and early 20th century, which had as a consequence the downgrading or elimination of broader social/group entities or structures by focusing on interactions and mutual influences between individual actors and their subjective perspectives and meanings. Objective meaning, however, did not disappear with the philosophy of history, as can be seen, inter alia, by the real-world operation of the heterogony of ends. A further focus of attention is on formal sociology, functionalism and the phenomenology of the interpenetrating of perspectives, understanding (the Other), consciousnesses, action plans, putting oneself into the position of the Other, self-interpretation, anticipating the Other, etc.,... of both people/actors in an archetypal-like (social-ontological) social relation. Reference is made to: Tönnies (who only saw the outer – and not inner – aspect of the social relation), v. Wiese, Simmel, Weber, Vierkandt, Gurvitch, Husserl, Schütz (incl. the motive-in-order-to [[think and or do...]] and the because-motive [[as to causality, reasons, justification(s),...]]), and Löwith. [[WTF? 5 out of 9 of these very important to super or even all-time-great thinkers were fucking JOOs!!! Ugh, YUK!!! Stiff Cheddar to ME!!! (AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]




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