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Title Pages and Table of Contents

Chapter IV

The Political and Man, Chapter IV, Section 1A: The inner mechanism of the social relation relates to mental acts (isolated in terms of theory and as a simplifying abstraction) necessary for a social relation to take place against the background of a pre-existing society (its processes of socialisation etc.), and involves understanding the Other has subjectivity, as well as putting oneself in the Other’s situation or position. Because of our social-ontological orientation, psychologism – as in the case of the spectrum of the social relation – is avoided at all costs, and we find that the inner mechanism of the social relation operates across the whole of the friend-foe spectrum and the said spectrum’s continuum, regardless of “positive or negative” characteristics of individuals. We are concerned with the mechanism as a form of the social relation applying to all individuals in all situations, and always interrelating with the spectrum of the social relation, and not with the psychological content in every particular instance, which might actually be of interest to (social) psychologists, historians and sociologists. The outer/external mechanism, involving external acts (including the internal acts) will be examined in detail in the second half of this chapter.   

Chapter IV, Section 1Ba delves into the fundamental characteristics of the Ego/I, the Other (and the Other’s imponderability), and subjectivity. The importance of society pre-existing individuals is highlighted in order to reiterate the theoretical context for social-ontological investigation. Equally important is the sharp demarcation between humans and non-human animals, of which all humans qua humans (generally) have a firm sense. There’s a very telling Freeman-Slave reference to Plato, followed by a “to be or not to be” explanation tying in with a fundamental characteristic of human subjectivity. It follows, that all humans have a sense of I (Ego) and Other (Alter) and subjectivity involved on both sides. Imponderability and incalculability, as well as changeability, all loom large in human social relations, and make the mechanism of the social relation constantly interact and intersect with the spectrum of the social relation and its Friend-Foe continuum. Related to the above is also a lack of (absolute) control – one cannot necessarily always control either the thoughts or the actions of the Other and or Others as much and as deeply as one might want to, even if one explains such lack of control (in concealing one’s own power claims and or actual power) as being the result of “irrationalism” or “blind drives/passions” etc.. The relative lack of (mobile) resistance of an inanimate object is contrasted to the always present potential of a human subject to either kill another human and or kill himself. Death, therefore, is key. Any subjectivity can potentially occupy any place along the continuum of the spectrum of the (Friend-Foe) social relation, and because there can never be a state of continual “total” control, there is never ANY possibility of “eternal peace” or “perfect harmony”. Interpretation cannot provide any definite and absolute certainty regarding the Other. The Other always retains its potential (at least) imponderability, incalculability and unpredictability. Of course, societies always provide – to varying degrees and in many various ways – institutions and or conventions which lessen the general aspect of imponderability and uncontrollability, yet such institutions and conventions can never efface conflict and or (potential) violence from society forever. The commonly held views, maxims, proverbs etc. of ordinary (primitive, etc./et al.) peoples across all cultures and known eras attest to the lack of total, permanent foreseeability and controllability of the Other. Ritual and magic in “primitive” tribes relate to the notion of bringing or trying to bring the uncontrollable under control. With a reference to Ortega y Gasset, mention is made of “the complete Other” who is not yet Friend or Foe, but does (or can) represent potential danger. Individuals constantly display a sense that the Other has similar formal capacities as to the mechanism of the social relation, but is always more than capable of acting unpredictably and or contrarily to the Ego’s own wishes etc.. Distance and proximity in the social relation relate to the taking on and assumption of roles, which will be investigated later in this chapter. General knowledge about all humans taking on roles and having subjectivity etc., guarantees no necessary knowledge about what another subjectivity will do in a concrete situation. Cf. La Rochefoucauld. Of course, a great deal of human behaviour and action is ponderable and foreseeable, because just as humans cannot live in a state of only conflict, so too, they cannot know absolutely nothing about what all other people will do next, etc.. Just as all normality has exceptions, so too, all societal contexts will include imponderability (Max Weber re: sociologically amorphous power and institutionally founded authority as dominance). Both ponderability and imponderability interrelate with BOTH friendship and enmity, though friendship must be wanted by both sides, which is not the case re: enmity. Joruba-tribe: peace is the father of friendship, as peace can exist not just between friends, but also between foes etc.. Discussion then follows regarding system and environment, ponderability-normality, Schütz, Parsons, ethnomethodology etc.. In particular, in regard to Schütz (and his with-world and environment distinction, etc.), there seems to be a theoretical tendency towards atomisation and general harmlessness without conflict etc. (= ideologically ideal for “multiculturalism” and the “concealment” of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystallisations of power. P.K., of course, does NOT expressly state this, but unless I’m imagining things, this seems to be the general tone of the argumentation). In any event, P.K. goes on to point out that compulsion and conflict never go permanently away, and the positing of “ideal circumstances” has nothing to do with reality. Subjectivity and a capacity to act not as expected are always present, as is the Other’s capability at rejecting and resisting. Parsons and G. H. Mead fell into similar theoretical traps as Schütz. Norms, rules, laws etc. in societies, can never remove the imponderability and incalculability always potentially present in subjectivity and its action. P.K. refers to the keeping to forms and the keeping up of appearances etc. as long as NOTHING VITAL as to identity (and power) is at stake. Norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground, as well as a battlefield. Even common meaning contexts (which are subject to varying interpretations, anyway) e.g. re: culture and language, guarantee no constant ponderability. Robbers and blackmailers will do their crimes, but they still have recourse to social norms, as in e.g. a mutually understood language. Common Sense is closer to the very varied and rich-in-situations reality than many a phenomenologist of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologist (P.K. does not say it, but I say it: in the 20th century = GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY = Jews in esp. the USA, France and England). Reference is made to the constant anxiety-like potentiality of existence, in which the Ego’s status and identity can always be potentially challenged etc.. The subjectivity of the Other is perceived not merely as acting (i.e. active), but also as perceiving (i.e. perceptive), whereby perception here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other, to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. It’s not, though, enough to refer to the Other’s dispositions to secure a permanent ponderability, which simply cannot be secured in reality (as a matter of social reality). P.K. master class time re: causality:

“Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, the subject’s (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for, and to take into account, the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in which the Other must unfold and develop his activity. In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. ... Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity as subjectivity par excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is, as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).”

Further discussion ensues as regards intentions and subjectivity and the overall objective factual situation, including the I (ego) acting in a friendly manner to someone who might want to do the I (ego) harm, because of specific considerations and interests, of which the I (ego) is cognizant, and not necessarily the Other. Reference to Nietzsche and his oversimplification re: intentions, subjectively meant and objective meaning. + The I (ego) tends to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) by means of intentions, and makes its own act(ion)s, especially act(ion)s unpleasant to the Other, more likely, plausible by means of circumstances. Whatever the case may be, subjectivity (and its always potential imponderability, even though much of it is and can be ponderable) is always prominent in human, social relations.

Section 1B(b) of Chapter IV, starts off by reminding us that just as ponderability and imponderability can relate to both friendship and enmity in accordance with each and every respective situation, so too alienness/unfamiliarity and familiarity have no necessary relationship with either friendship or enmity. Hence, if identity (and its vital interests) are not put at risk, the alien or strange (and uncanny, weird, eerie or mysterious), including any attendant relativisation of one’s own values, not only is not viewed as inimical, it can even be worshipped, depending, again, on the concrete situation. Furthermore, the alien/strange does not at all have to come “from without” but could be someone from a particular group who does not “conform” in some kind of noticeable and or “offensive/abnormal” way. P.K. refers to the fact that extreme conflict such as civil wars and family vendettas have existed when the cultural and or other affinity is relatively close. In other words, strangeness or alienness does not carry with it any inherent “quality” of conflict etc. which does not or cannot exist in circumstances of relative familiarity and or similarity. “Prejudice”, being a kind of typification, i.e. rendering into types, can NEVER be eliminated (simply because humans qua humans always (have the capacity to) think in terms of categories and groups, as well as individuals, and make distinctions,... regardless of how those distinctions are geared by favouring x and prejudicing y,... etc. [[SO, “fighting” one form of “racism and supremacy” simply promotes another form of “racism and supremacy”, including situations when ABSOLUTELY FILTHY AND DISGUSTING ANIMAL-RAT/RODENT-LIKE GROUPS (AS A SUBJECTIVE MATTER OF TASTE) IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES “ENJOY” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE FORMS OF POWER AND WEALTH AT ELITE LEVEL, INCLUDING THROUGH PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING AND HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT IN BANKING, HIGH FINANCE, CORPORATIONS, ETC.]]). Notwithstanding any initial tension (rather than surprise in the case of someone familiar taking up a different position in the spectrum of the social relation), once the alien is active in a social relation with someone, the said alien will take up a position in the spectrum of the social relation just like any familiar person. Everyone, thus, can become “estranged and alienated”, or the other way around, regardless of whether people were initially familiar or alien to others. There is reference to Husserl and “a core of the state of knowing and familiarity” in regard to even the most alien and strange, whereas even the most familiar can or does contain an element of alienness. What is always KEY is THE SOCIAL REALTION AND IDENTITY (POWER), and where people stand within the social relation between one another. So, non-Greeks were NOT barbarians to Greeks in Homer, but were most definitely in the 5th century... Both idealisation and daemonisation (worship of the alien and or stranger, and killing the alien/stranger) are always possible, as is the whole gamut of possible social relations. Very illustrative is Levine’s schematisation: if a friendly relation(ship) towards the alien/foreigner/stranger unfolds or develops, then he becomes in the case of a visit, like a guest; in the case of a temporary stay, like a resident; and in the case of a lasting, i.e. permanent, stay, like a newly accepted member of the community; if, however, the relation(ship) turns into something inimical, then one treats the stranger/alien, in the first case, like an intruder/interloper/penetrator/infiltrator/invader; in the second case, like an internal foe; and in the third case, like a pariah or outcast. The alien can show tremendous zeal to confirm in a new society, or can go the opposite way and display tremendous aggressivity to the host population, by exploiting any freedoms offered to him as a kind of release valve or vent. [[I’ve lived all this through personal experience, but of course, never with physical violence or being needlessly rude to anyone (there's no point and it's against the law...) (AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!):]] The inimical pole of the social relation is, therefore, here occupied when the alien/stranger, in regard to all points, stresses the differences between himself and the new surroundings or environment; the friendly pole of the social relation is occupied when the alien/stranger wants to desperately and absolutely be assimilated, in relation to which he may express the same inability to really understand foreign (alien or strange) mores and ways of thinking, both in regard to exaggerated and overdone censure and reproach, or in regard to exaggerated and overdone praise. In between (the said two exaggerated and overdone extremes), there are stances like for instance outer (external) adaptation during inner (internal) distancing etc.. The discussion now turns to trust and mistrust, and it is explained how whilst trust requires at the very least a certain familiarity, overall, both trust and mistrust can arise in view of both the relatively familiar and the relatively unfamiliar. KEY AGAIN IS ALWAYS THE SOCIAL RELATION AND THE SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN IT. Trust is always particular (i.e. a part or a portion as opposed to the whole), it relates to certain aspects of social life, certain subjects or certain properties and qualities of these subjects, which, by the way, means that trust is regularly accompanied by mistrust against other aspects of social life, against other subjects, or against other properties and qualities of these subjects. Given that societal norms and rules are never totally adhered to by everyone, and in fact can be breached regularly by many people, depending on the situation, trust cannot be a phenomenon characterising the whole of society, but must take place in regard to specific, concrete, in part, particular, individual circumstances and situations. Trust – closely connected to “expectations” (whose content can vary from person to person), aims, intentions,... – is basically nothing other than an ultimate or final irreducible statement about ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability): absolute trust applies to the absolutely ponderable (calculable); imponderability (incalculability) is synonymous and tantamount to untrustworthiness and unreliability. Trust can exist in all kinds of relations including between criminals, and does not have to exist for there to be an expectation. Individual and collective life would not be possible (it would become paralysed) if everyone trusted everyone absolutely. Trust does not and cannot constitute an original magnitude, but presupposes a certain shaping and formation of the social relation, i.e. in concrete cases there can be fixed, on-going trust between people, but not to the extent that the inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation can be eliminated. Whoever gives or bestows trust, confirms the person being given trust’s identity, and the return or reciprocation of trust functions as the recognition for this recognition. Neither does trust connect or link the totality of the societal extent, scope or reference, nor does trust, at a certain moment, connect all members of society with all members of this same society. Social-ontologically, of interest is the ascertainment that existing trust indeed promotes and reinforces friendship and co-operation, but by no means suffices to guarantee friendship and co-operation’s smooth course; in very many cases, in fact, precisely this course constitutes the precondition and prerequisite for the emergence of trust. At the overall societal level, trust develops its effect not in chemical purity, but in its – from case to case – mix and blend of heterogeneous elements in different doses. The discussion proceeds to impersonal “rational mistrust” in particular as regards institutions and very importantly, FEAR. I.e., by keeping people afraid of sanctions, punishments etc., society is aided in terms of social disciplining and reducing imponderabilities by people “rationally mistrusting” such institutions, etc.. In this sense, the Joruba are right: peace, that is, an institutionally fairly well-ordered state of affairs, not, for instance, trust, is the father of friendship. Of course, there are also cases where personal trust bypassing the “rational mistrust” re: fear and institutions etc. plays a role (P.K. refers to Albanians, and not to Satanists, but he could have... AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!). Reality has proved time and time again that Emerson’s “Trust men and they will be true to you”, does not hold for everyone all of the time in the real world of the social relation. Yet, in such moral stances, the ideal self-understanding of society is expressed and carries on living, of which society has unconditional need in order to be able to function as a society. Examples from Democritus, Seneca and Shakespeare show an awareness that trust on its own is hardly sufficient for honesty or sincere relations between all people; that trust is the opposite of fear and vice versa, etc.. There can be no generalised trust. The dangerous and risky imponderability (incalculability) of the Other is the ultimate source of, in practice, offered and shown “rational mistrust”. Chamfort = wisdom goes with fear. Similarly, the Ashanti. In Western mass democracies, “trust”, the concept, at last became a major part of theory, connected to communication, “rationality”, pluralism and the associated [[particularly ZIO-Satanic, I say, not P.K.]] sentimentalisation permeating Western societies. The functionalist Simmel made the error of tying trust into supposedly enhanced/increasing societal objectification and ponderability from a “community” vs. “society” perspective, with modern “society” providing “objectification” tying into enhanced trust and “reliability” making any need for “personal” relationships superfluous (and this, from a JOO!!! Simmel must have been a VERY NON-JOO, JOO!!!). The reality is that notions of the objective and the personal have been around since ancient times (Socrates/Plato) and magicians/“primitive peoples”. Luhmann-like systems theory positions also do not prove that society can reach a level where trust (as opposed to mistrust) can eliminate conflict etc.. It becomes obvious, therefore, that what counts are the social relation and constellations/correlations of power, and not e.g. “thoughtlessness and frivolity” in relation to trust and mistrust. P.K. gives some relevant examples of how power relations affect trust, ending with the example of (nearly) all people locking their front door and taking the key with them when they leave their home.

[[SO, what is paramount from a strictly scientific-descriptive point of view, is that society has a relative balance/equilibrium between the material conditions of living for the masses (access to food, shelter, goods, health, jobs, employment, income etc.) as they relate to the ideological-aesthetical acceptance of power structures and institutions, hierarchies, dominant ideology, etc., rather than the racial and or cultural make up of a society per se. When, however, such a balance or equilibrium becomes relatively unhinged by e.g. masses of anomic-ape behaviour or by a non-acceptance at elite and or lower levels of the hierarchies of distributions of forms of power and wealth etc., then the SHIT CAN POTENTIALLY HIT THE FAN, and that could mean the (increased, enhanced, radicalised, etc.) entry of racial and or cultural matters into the politics within the political and the social. Neither relative “monoculturalism”, nor relative “multiculturalism” is – per se and as such and inherently – a “Strength” or a “Weakness”. It depends. As do aesthetical preferences, depend...]]         

Chapter IV, Section 1Ca amounts to a brief historical-theoretical overview of the adoption of perspectives in social theory. Readers are reminded of the disconnecting of sociology from the philosophy of history in the late 19th and early 20th century, which had as a consequence the downgrading or elimination of broader social/group entities or structures by focusing on interactions and mutual influences between individual actors and their subjective perspectives and meanings. Objective meaning, however, did not disappear with the philosophy of history, as can be seen, inter alia, by the real-world operation of the heterogony of ends. A further focus of attention is on formal sociology, functionalism and the phenomenology of the interpenetrating of perspectives, understanding (the Other), consciousnesses, action plans, putting oneself into the position of the Other, self-interpretation, anticipating the Other, etc.,... of both people/actors in an archetypal-like (social-ontological) social relation. Reference is made to: Tönnies (who only saw the outer – and not inner – aspect of the social relation), v. Wiese, Simmel, Weber, Vierkandt, Gurvitch, Husserl, Schütz (incl. the motive-in-order-to [[think and or do...]] and the because-motive [[as to causality, reasons, justification(s),...]]), and Löwith. [[WTF? 5 out of 9 of these very important to super or even all-time-great thinkers were fucking JOOs!!! Ugh, YUK!!! Stiff Cheddar to ME!!! (AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]

Chapter IV, Section 1Cb constitutes, inter alia, and as it were, the “brainwashing/lobotomisation” description sub-section of The Political and Man. The reading here is VERY HEAVY, SLOW-GOING, and requires A LOT OF TIME AND PATIENCE. However, as always, any reader who gets himself (and far less likely, herself) to the point of understanding “what is going on”, WILL – as always with P.K.’s absolutely UNIQUE in the History of Ideas, Theory and Thought, way of dissecting, analysing and putting THINGS – BE VERY RICHLY REWARDED. Of course, P.K. uses a language as neutral as possible, and leaves it to “interpreters” like myself to draw their own conclusions. Hence, before getting into the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, we are reminded of the assumption of roles and imponderability, unpredictability cum subjectivity, and not being able to know what the Other is thinking with any constant, consistent certainty. The very important juxtaposition is made with regard to non-human animals, in that humans through human language and symbolism and the assumption of roles etc. have developed a capacity for, and (cap)ability at, deceit, deception, delusion and illusion which are unknown in the rest of the animal kingdom, which (comparatively) tends to react more immediately to the immediate stimuli of the immediate environment in generally more rigidly typified manners. Reference is then made to the human ability to plan future action, and the very human need to want to anticipate the future actions of others etc.. Human reflective (thought) activity exists with the Ego’s knowledge that the Other also has such a reflective capacity and ability and, in practice, the fact that the Ego takes into account the Other’s possible action plans, as well as vice versa, constitutes a crucial (hard core) aspect of the mechanism of the social relation. Reflective activity also intersects with interpretation, opening up a whole array of possibilities in thought, anticipation, understanding and actual action, etc., especially given that a number of (groups of) Others may be within the Ego/I’s range of thought and thought cum action. There is never any necessary correlation between seeing things from the Other’s point of view and also identifying in part or wholly or not (at all) with the Other. Every case depends on the actual situation of the I (ego) and Other, etc.. Role-taking/the assumption of roles is an inner reflective activity and non-binding, whereas role-playing has outer action characteristics too, which will be discussed also in the next sub-section in relation to G.H. Mead. The two levels of role-taking/the assumption and taking on/over of roles include role-taking/the assumption and taking on/over of roles, with the second level also being role-playing (outer behaviour or (rather) action). The scientific observer’s social-ontic level observes an I (ego) and an Other capable of role-taking and role-playing, which are absolutely essential for the social relation’s mechanism. Concrete interaction involving content, does not have the necessary commonality as to content which the form-related/formal aspect of the mechanism of the social relation has for both the I (ego) and the Other. Grosso modo, the relationship between the formal/form-related mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles, and the content of roles, is like the relationship between social ontology, and, sociology and history. Likewise, prognoses of concrete roles are no task of social ontology, but a matter for historical-psychological and sociological analysis. The omnipresent co-existence of both form-related and content-related levels of the mechanism of the social relation as it pertains to role-taking and role-playing, means that man is always both familiar and potentially strange, alien to man. Reference is made to the Great David Hume and the passions common to all humans. The I (ego) cannot know what the Other will do or what the Other is thinking or will not necessarily come to an agreement with the Other just because the I (ego) is aware that the Other has the same capacity for, and ability at, role-taking and role-playing as the I (ego). Moreover, consent is possible where there are misunderstandings, and dissent is possible when there is full understanding of the Other, etc.. Solipsism occurs when the I (ego) considers that the Other should select the same content as the I (ego), notwithstanding that the I (ego) realises that the Other has the same ability as the I (ego) at the assumption and taking on/over of roles etc.. When solipsism does not reach level of self-destruction, the extent it occurs is related to identity, which in turn, relates, inter alia, to orientation and (im)ponderability. No matter how ponderable the I (ego) wants the Other’s behaviour to be, and no matter to what extent the I (ego) assumes and takes on/over the Other’s perspective, “I did not expect that of him” is always an ever-present potential reality. There is no Covering Law Model. And the actual understanding of the Other as taking on/ over the Other’s perspective(s), role(s) is an ideal-type-like construct intersecting with a whole series about general human essence and behaviour, in any case. There is never any permanent, fixed certainty about the Other. Only a posteriori can we know, and “philosophers” can then very easily go about “selling their wares” in the marketplace of ideas. The mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and roles is formal, form-related, structural and common to everyone, whereas the (necessarily variable) typifications people use for understanding are content-related. For interaction to take place, the I (ego) must first form some kind of picture or image of the Other (“objective” or not, whether about the Other as a person as a whole or not). The discussion then shifts to the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which has to do with the aim of the interaction (in a broad sense) between the I (ego) and the Other and the construct of the Other as to the Other’s inner and outer state for the purposes of the I (ego) putting itself in the situation and position of the Other. In other words, the “true, objective, (in)complete” or otherwise picture of the Other is not of importance, but the picture – which is oriented towards the actual interaction of the actual social relation in question (including with regard to typifications involving deviations from accepted and or dominant norms and models of behaviour) – is what counts. Typifications are absolutely unavoidable during the unfolding of interaction, so all talk about “stereotypes” seems ludicrous when one considers that types are part of the way people perceive others and things, ANYWAY! Three possibilities are present in regard to the subjective perception and objective meaning: 1) when the I (ego) does not care what the Other objectively thinks and wants in regard to its action, and simply goes along with the Other’s projections, claims etc. (= the lobotomisation-point of the I (ego)); 2) the I (ego) goes along with the perspective of the Other, in order to know what the Other objectively wants by its actions; 3) the I (ego) just looks at the actions of the Other, and is not concerned with the Other’s motives and intentions. The power relationship becomes crucial in the third case, when the Other reacts adversely to the I (ego) not being interested in the Other’s intentions etc., and it is well known from courtly times of long ago how flattery etc. can operate to the comparative favour of the weaker side, given the (massive) power imbalance. A number of scenarios are presented regarding more or less symmetrical relations of power. Both sides taking into account the other’s perspective (a kind of ideal type of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) is no guarantee of itself for consensus, because the inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation can just as easily potentially be called into play when both sides “understand” each other etc..  The simultaneous development of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at a form-related (i.e. formal) and a content-related level procures for the actors a possibility, whose meaning for social life can hardly be overestimated: the possibility of suggestion and of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit). AND SO P.K. GOES INTO “I’M THE GREATEST THINKER OF ALL TIME” MODE FOR THE UMPTEENTH TIME AGAIN ... WHAT FOLLOWS ARE ABSOLUTELY STUNNING PASSAGES AND PARAGRAPHS ON BRAINWASHING AND LOBOTOMISATION, POWER, IDENTITY, ETC.. Here’s a further teaser: Since the I (ego) suggests to the Other a deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)), it guides the behaviour of the Other in such a way that now the appropriate reaction to the Other’s (re)action suggested by the deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)) is that action which the I (ego) in truth (i.e. in reality) intended, planned or aimed at. Also included, is discussion about affects, emotions and the reflectivity of thought. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is necessarily reflective, whereas the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is characterised by a possibly affect-laden (i.e. loaded-with-sentiments-and-emotions) narrowness or tightness. The latter situation, however, does not mean that the I (ego) will not be able to engage in the former assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. There is no such thing as a rationality which is free of emotions and “ethical”. Only a Satanic Circus Monkey Person in Western Mass Democracies, would ever claim so, in order to e.g. Obfuscate the Reality of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE accumulations, concentrations and crystallisations of forms of Power and Wealth including through Primitive Secret Society Networking (mafia-like behaviour of deceit and favouritism, nepotism, etc.) and centuries of elite-level involvement in Banking, Finance, International Trade and later Corporations. For these are the ZIO-SATANISTS, these are the ANIMALS from HELL. Differences in intellectual talent and available information and or the fact that aims are diametrically opposed affect neither the commonality of the mechanism of the social relation and the potential for deception, deceit, etc.. What matters is the broader framework of power relations, and not necessarily if one side is actually more intellectually talented and better informed than the other side. Presenting interaction and interaction’s mechanism in terms of form (formalisation), invariably presume equal intellectual talent and equal access to information, as well as common and equal ethically loaded “rationality” etc. and thus create theories which end up being ideological and or utopistic, because they do not take into consideration the reality of (networks of) power relations and associated hierarchies, inequalities, power relations’ complexities, and social-ontological/anthropological constants. [[That is why before ZIO-USA proper, we have the groundwork laid by the Protestants and others, such as Dewey, Pierce, James, Royce, Cooley and G.H. Mead (Blumer, W.I. Thomas, R.E. Park) as reflecting nascent mass-democratic ideology (it’s not just the JOO, Boas!), culminating in Parsons, before the ZIO-Excrement take over in academia, esp. from the 1960s (and hence the understandable but futile reactions of Revilo Oliver to the Primitive Secret Society ZIO-Excrement; especially because at the business/Big Money level, Henry Ford reacted first (all to no avail) and a great sociologist like Sombart “got shafted and conveniently forgotten about”, whilst even the nearly GREATEST OF ALL TIME, Max Weber, got “sidelined” compared to a total JOO NINCOMPOOP like Derri-JOO-DA (JOO, ZIO, SATANIC EXCEMENT-FILTH), though Goffman (like Arendt and N. Elias) obviously has some not inconsiderable value, as e.g. does Morgenthau, ... AND ... not to mention Wagner being deemed “naughty” for simply speaking TRUTHS about the ZIO-Excrement ... (there is a clear reason why Schmitt and Heidegger were “silent” because before Hitler’s reign the SATANIC-HEBROO-ZIO-JOO-FILTH WERE GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY (INCL. THROUGH PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING ETC.) INVOLVED AT ELITE LEVELS OF GERMAN SOCIETY (FROM BANKING AND FINANCE, TO THE MASS MEDIA, ACADEMIA, THE LAW AND “ENTERTAINMENT”) ... AND P.K.s GREAT TEACHERS with WHOM HE HAD PERSONAL INTERACTION WITH, KNEW THIS VERY WELL = BRUNNER, CONZE (WHO WROTE EXTENSIVELY ABOUT THE ZIO EXCREMENT), KOSELLECK, ARNDT ... Hitler, of course, Literally went Bananas and became Satanic himself ... whereas Stalin and MAO knew they had to “shut the whole shop” and KEEP THE ZIO-EXCREMENT-MAMMON SCUM OUT. Deng, seeing that the Soviet Union could not “handle it” any more, had a Dream, and “played along” with the ZIO-Excrement and their MAMMON-Protestant, Cock-Sucking and Papist EVIL-DEVIL Satanist Partners, only though to Attempt to DO what no other Third-Worlder had ever previously managed to achieve (from Egypt’s Mohomut Mohomut c. 1800 to the Japs c. 1900-1945) i.e. to OverTurn Western Domination on the White-Devil Man’s (Industrial/Military Might and Power) Terms. The White-Devil Man, of course, included the ZIO-JOO-HEBROO-I WANT TO BE SICK-VOMIT-ULTRA UGLY-DEVIL-EVIL-EVIL-DEVIL-SATANIC-LUCIFER-PARASITIC-FLEA-LEECH-VULTURE-POO-FAECES-DUNG-EXCREMENT-JUDAS-MAMMON MAN, and Han Man knows THAT (Hindu Man knows it TOO, but Hindu Man FLOATS TOO MUCH and hasn’t yet even taken Historical Revenge on the Muhumuts for all they DID to Hinduism (and Buddhism) over the Centuries)). Anyway, From the Age of Satan (Joos, Femino-Faggots, Negro Worship, Otherisation, Circusisation, Freakification etc., etc., etc., under Uproot-De-Root, preceded by all the many decades and centuries of the Up-Root/De-Root Massification, Atomisation, Industrialisation, Secularisation, Urbanisation, etc. etc., etc.), ... to the Age of the Ape ... that’s the way it’s going...]] So, apart from G.H. Mead’s social psychology and interactionism (as well as formalisation at the service of ethics), in the USA, there was also mathematically-inspired game theory, in terms of major attempts at theorising the social relation. (Goffman, inter alia, nuanced Mead’s formalistic approach, and game theory was less “ethicising” since it focused on strategic and power/ technical matters, but could never ever secure “certainty” of outcome, and was thus ultimately theoretically redundant because many decades beforehand the Great Clausewitz pointed out the necessity of “tact of judgement”, which can never by surpassed as a concept for understanding the ultimate openness of human existence and many concrete situations (interrelations and interactions). Game theory, however, should be acknowledged for acknowledging the reality of deception and deceit in interaction, as well as the three basic possibilities of: pure conflict; pure co-ordination; mixture of conflict and interdependence). The inner mechanism of the social relation (the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) can unfold and develop only against the background of the spectrum of the social relation, and such unfolding and development is potentially open to all kinds of positionings and interpretations of signs and symbolism and language exchanged within the spectrum of the social relation, depending every time, on the concrete situation. Symbolic interactionism was able to ascertain the importance of interpretation, something lacking in structuralistic approaches, system theories and role theories. However, symbolic interactionism only did, as it were, “half of the job”, because it lacked awareness of the social relation’s spectrum’s polarity, continuity and effect on perspective-taking and the mechanism of the social relation. This, in turn, was due to e.g. Mead’s student Blumer not letting go of strong ethical proclivities, so that (extreme) enmity was given a lesser stature than what it should have in theoretical contemplation, including post-WW2 (see discussion in Ch. III, incl. references to many Joos like Lipset, Gurvitch, Schütz and Leo Strauss). Interactionist(ic) social psychologists did not come to grips with the realities of power relations affecting interaction, and hence tended towards idealistic theoretical models emphasising consensus, when conflict has never, and will never, disappear (cf. Scheff, Homans). Theoretical errors take place when the interests and aims of actors (and possible consensus or dissent) are confused with the mutual assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Shibutani). Social-psychologically (and social-ontologically), there is no structural difference between actors, who behave in conformity with norms, and such actors who ignore or ride roughshod over norms. R. Turner saw that there is no general principle of norm conformity. A real sociologist worthy of the name “sociologist” like Norbert Elias (Joo), was fully aware of the co-existence of enmity, along with friendship, and from a real sociologist like N. Elias, we get to an “all-time” great and theoretician of enmity: the one and only Machiavelli, incl. in relation to perspective-taking, deception and deceit. The Other as foe should never be underestimated because he has all the social-ontological and anthropological potential ability at “rationality” as perspective-taking and capacity for deceit as the I (ego). There is a pertinent reference to the hunt/chase as being potentially life-threatening when the I (ego) is not able to assume and take on/over the perspective of the Other as hunter. There is also reference to Clausewitz’s notion of interaction (mutual influence) and how one is not master of oneself without defeating one’s foe. ... The spiral of enmity heightens and intensifies precisely due to the fact that both foes put themselves in the situation and position – at ever higher tiers, levels, stages or grades – of the other (side) on each and every respective occasion. ... Likewise, with friendship. P.K. then goes through a number of basic examples of perspective-taking and friendly and inimical relations. Confusion surrounding sociality and socialisation, and the confusing of consensus related to content(s) with consensus related to expectations, are also pointed out. Enmity and struggle are just like friendship, social. There is no sociality and socialisation which only relates to norm conformity, as ethicists would have it. Because there actually is the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, there cannot be just norm conformity. There will be norm non-conformity too. The Other has a psyche of his own.






Chapter IV, sub-section 1Cc, “The George Herbert Mead sub-section”, is not only fascinating in relation to the (vacillating, wavering) battle of notions, aims and conceptualisations in (the (almost) Great) Mead’s thinking, particularly between the Desire for Scientific Observation (Description and Explanation), and, the Desire for “Democracy and Equality”, including in relation to the Mechanism of the Assumption and Taking On/Over of Perspectives, Communication, the Friend-Foe Spectrum of the Social Relation, (Im)Ponderability and Identity, etc. ... without ever Coming to Grips with (Explaining Group and Individual) Power ImBalances etc., ... so that it becomes apparent that for the Satanists (Da Joos and their (FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA LOBOTMISED) allies) to be able to GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY take over American and then Western High Theory (including through their Satanic Circus Monkey Primitive Secret Society Networking (i.e. the Satanism of JUDAS and MAMMON)), the GroundWork had been very Thoroughly Laid by the Protestant-Papist-Secularist-Atheists in General, with G.H. Mead representing one of the High Points of American Theory and its Programmatic Mixing of Scientific Intent with Normative-Ethical Concerns. [[The United States of America, both in terms of Overall Political and Economic Development (“Democratic Populism” and the Rise of Corporations (JOOporations)), along with the anti-European, anti-oligarchic bourgeois Ethos and Ideology of “Democratic Equality”, was the Perfect Staging Ground for The Representatives of Satan (The Extremely Satanic Hate Tribe of JUDAS and MAMMON) to play GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE roles in and at all Elite Facets and Levels of Society, from Banking, High Finance and International Trade (where the Satanist Mammonist Tribal JUDAS DEVIL-EVIL-EVIL-DEVIL Extremists had centuries of Experience in Europe) to Mass Media, Mass Entertainment, Academia, Government Policy, “Education”, BrainWashing, Full-Spectrum ZIO-USA Lobotomisation, etc., ensuring that the West would SPIN ITS OWN SELF OUT OF CONTROL AND INTO AUTO-GENOCIDAL NON-EXISTENCE by about c. 2100. A Job Very Well Done. Here, Give YourSelves a PRIZE! (The Only Consolation for the NON-Satanists of European Origin Left, is that Han Man and or Ape Man and or Another Man is going to eventually have to DEEP FRY ALL OF THEM, BECAUSE NO-ONE CAN STAND THEM ONCE ONE GETS PAST BEING HYPNOTISED AND BRAIN-WASHED BY THEM OR SIMPLY DOES NOT WANT TO CO-OPERATE WITH THEM MAMMONISTICALLY-JUDASISTICALLY-SATANISTICALLY IN TERMS OF THEIR EXTREMIST ZIO EXCREMENTAL UNENDING EVIL HATE WITH ALL THEIR DISGUSTING GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE MANIFESTATIONS OF FORMS OF POWER AND WEALTH, INCLUDING THE RIDICULOUS OVER-PROJECTION OF THE ZIOCAUST, WHEN MORE THAN 250 (TWO-HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLION) INNOCENTS DIED IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, INCLUDING TENS AND TENS AND TENS OF MILLIONS OF ORTHODOX BROTHERS AND SISTERS AND DESCENDENTS THEREOF AND OTHER RELATIVELY WHITE CHRISTIANS AND OR ATHEISTS, NOT TO MENTION ALL THE ASIANS, LATINOS, AFRICANS (KAFFIRS) ET AL.).]] References are also made to W. James, H. Bergson, M. Scheler, the great É. Durkheim (LEGEND and HONOURARY JOO), W. McDougall, and J. B. Watson. The discussion turns to the “I”, which the “Me” of norms and collective human-social existence does not seem to be able to, as it were, “fix”, on an absolute and permanent basis. Mead reaches the point of describing the “I’s” assumption of the assumption of perspectives of the “Me”, but does not describe the full implications of such a state of affairs for the social relation as a social-ontological/anthropological magnitude. Mead is most interested in the “Me” giving the “I” an “objective” point of orientation (i.e. he predates all the ZIO(/USA)-Excrement (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste) and their Allies in producing “theory” and in engaging in various forms of thought control and brain washing (which mutatis mutandis, all societies DO – one way or another, in any event and anyway). Mead does not see or does not want to grapple with the fact that not only the “I” differs from person to person, but also the “I’s” construction and or perception of the “Me” also (potentially) differs. Mead’s schema has the “Me” as untouched by the fluctuations in the way(s) the “I” sees itself. P.K. goes on to make the extremely important point that notions such as “good manners”, “equality”, “human dignity” (I add: “racism”, “sexism”, “-phobia this”, “anti-that” etc.) are all contingent on what content arises from the concrete situation of interactions between “I” and “relevant Others” etc.. Mead also assumes a “normality” and a “rationality” and a complying with norms as regards fundamentals in “civilised life”, which “just happens”, because there is no other way to extract an Ought from the Is of the “generalised Other”. [[All of this produces a strong ideological backdrop for ZIO-USA, which the ZIO-Excrement and their allies will pounce upon once they get into GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE positions of elite-level power and wealth in their in-part GROSSLY DISPROPOTIONATE takeover of the USA and thereafter leading all of the rest of the West into AUTO-GENOCIDE AND MASS AUTO-SUICIDE. This could only be possible in circumstances of the aftereffects of the two world wars, Konsum, Hedonismus, Toleranz, Kelsen-Popper Satanic Multi-Kulti Open Society, Pluralismus etc. and the FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO/USA lobotomy with the ABSOLUTELY DISGUSTING GROSS OVER-PROJECTION OF THE ZIOCAUST, AS IF THE DEATH OF SIX (6) MILLION PIECES OF ZIO-FILTH-POO-FAECES-DUNG-RAT-VERMIN-PARASITIC-FLEA-VULTURE-FAECES- CANCER COULD MEAN ANYTHING WHEN COMPARED TO THE DEATH OF ONE GREEK (HELLENE, ROMAN), LET ALONE TENS AND TENS AND TENS OF MILLIONS OF ORTHODOX BROTHERS AND SISTERS (RUSSIANS, SERBIANS, ET AL.), AND DESCENDANTS THEREOF, NOT TO MENTION ALL THE OTHER TENS AND TENS AND TENS OF MILLIONS OF WHITE CHRISTIANS, WHITE ATHEISTS (INCLDUING GERMAN HUN KRAUT TEUTONS), AND ALL THE YELLOWS, BROWNS, MIXED AND BLACKS (KAFFIRS), NUMBERING IN TOTAL MORE THAN 200 OR 250 MILLION HUMAN BEINGS (TWO HUNDRED OR TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLION) DEAD IN THE 20TH CENTURY, WHO APPARENTLY ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE THE SAME “INHERENT HUMAN VALUE” AS A ZIO-SCUMBAG (JOO, HEBROO PIECE OF MAMMON-SATAN-ULTRA-VILE-VOMIT-POO), WHO CLAIM ARE “SPECIAL” AND “CHOSEN”, WHILST PROMOTING THE SATANIC IDEOLOGY OF EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE FORMS OF ZIO-JOO-HEBROO-MAMMON-SATANIC-ELITE POWER AND WEALTH IN CERTAIN “WESTERN” COUNTRIES. ALL OF THIS COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED WITHOUT THE PROTESTANTS, THE PAPISTS, THE ATHEISTS AND THE COCK-SUCKERS GETTING ON BOARD THE MAMMON-SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY UP-ROOT, DE-ROOT ZIO-USA, ZIO-UK, ZIO-FRANCE, ZIO-GERMANY, ZIO-RUSSIA TRAIN, LEADING THE WEST TO ITS PATHETIC JUNGLE APE MAN END BY c. 2100.]] So, Mead ends up “in a pickle”, because his “generalised Other” assuming certain content cannot theoretically adequately cover cases of e.g. the charismatic dictator, collective psychosis, the invocation of (the religion) of “rationality”, the revolutionary party, the heretical sect, the fiery prophet, the afterworld etc.. The “Me” can only say on a scientific basis that there will be social norms, not what these social norms must be. “When the voice of the generalised Other is internalised in the sense of this form-related (i.e. formal) That, then the renegade or apostate “I” feels, precisely by invoking the “Me”, responsible and in a position to determine the What based on its own power (i.e. without anyone’s permission, or, just like that), and at the same time in fact, having a clear conscience for his part.” [[AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]] Mead does not go into the need for a stable identity able to play a number of different roles in regard to different people and or situations, and that is related to his downplaying of the “I” vis-à-vis the “Me”. “This partly unclear, partly weak status of the “I” comes or stems, though, from Mead’s decision to tackle and solve the problem of identity in accordance with an ethically-normatively inspired paedogogics of socialisation” (so it’s quite clear here, that the non-ZIO, of Protestant-Papist-Secular-Atheist origin, Americans, like G.H. Mead, paved the way with their Americano-centric “Democratic” “Equality” ideology for all the ZIO-Excrement and their allies to later feed off in terms of the production of mass-democratic ideology and FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA LOBOTOMISATION). Mead’s thinking leads to notions of a homogenised society of like-minded individuals with similar fundamental ethics, however, Mead was also not so naive as to believe there was no individuality in the real world, though he did want such individuality to be functionally beneficial for society. Thus, the ultimate logical consequences of Mead’s thought came into conflict with his ethical sympathies. RE: THE ISSUE OF “EQUALITY” GENERALLY, THIS IS VERY INTERESTING, ISN’T IT? “Mead himself stresses, incidentally, what significance and meaning for the “realisation” of identity, the striving to occupy certain positions inside of groups has – and behind this striving stands the “feeling” or perhaps the “to everyone, common conviction” that “we are basically better than other men”, as well as the “demand for one’s own identity to be realised by some kind of superiority over fellow men surrounding us”; this demand is “constant”, that is, obviously ineradicable and simultaneously regrettable and morally reprehensible. (The feeling of superiority steps backwards and recedes in situations in which the continuing existence and survival of the individual depends on the group). If that is so, then society consists inevitably and always of “narrowed and constricted” identities, and only of such identities.” Like the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, socialisation has its form-related/formal level and content-related level, which do not have to coincide (and that applies to relatively undifferentiated “sect-like” groups/societies). Or in other words, the generalised “Me” cannot always equally socialise all “I’s”. Hence, at the form-related level, socialisation concerns individuals “knowing what to say and do” (regardless of ethical content), whereas at the ethical or ethics-related level, different societies produce varying models of what “should be said and done” (as to specific, concrete ethical content). But once someone is “socialised” in a particular society, it’s just as possible for the veneer of socialisation to be used as a means to circumvent, undermine or otherwise certain societal norms (i.e. the “Me” is transformed into the servant of the “I”). Whilst normatively sanctioned equilibria are possible in a society, Mead’s conceptual instruments are neither consistently nor comprehensively sufficient in order to satisfy social-ontological claims. Mead’s social psychology was disseminated and found supporters precisely because of it’s ethically-normatively determined one-sidedness and ambiguity [[and I add: Mead’s social psychology (in part in contrast to the (more interpretive than normative) succeeding symbolic interactionism of incl. Mead’s students and followers e.g. Blumer against behaviourism/Watson (but also against the weakness of (more normative than interpretive) Parsonian(-like) interaction cum systems theory (also succeeding Mead)), who did go further than Mead’s social (not narrow/ Watsonian) behaviourism, but also did not fully realise that the social relation (constitutively) has just as much as its mechanism, its (Friend-Foe) spectrum as well – though Mead definitely displayed awareness of enmity existing as well as friendship constitutively in society, notwithstanding his hope in “evolution” bettering the human condition etc.) ... constituted the perfect ideological-quasi-scientific “radical/mass-democratic” building block (along with Kelsen and Popper (and Boas), and later the mostly ZIO-“Frankfurt School” (cum “communication”), and the system(s) and interaction of Parsons (though Parsons still remained, like G. H. Mead (and Cooley), something of a theoretical high point of American social theory)) for mainstream Protestant/Papist/Atheist- and then ZIO-USA (mass/radical-)democratic “equality” ideology (as opposed to the “invisible hand” and the ethical insight into/understanding of the autonomous individual Reason of (oligarchic bourgeois or classical) liberalism, which was then from the 1960s/1970s supplemented by The Absolutely Demented Inanity of Jew-RriDa and Joo-Cault (even though Joo-Cault had some strengths, too) ... to lead what remained of The West to Complete Self-Effacing, Mass Auto-Lobotomisation and Auto-Genocide (at the level of ideas, interacting with the level of broader social-economic (inter)action). If I were Han Man and or Ape Man, I’d just KEEP CALM and Wait for when The Time is RIPE. A Matter of Time (50, 100, 150, 500 years ... whatever ... (I don’t think, though, it’s going to be 500 years)) ...]]  

Chapter IV, Section ID, is a very important section, just like they all are. The topic is the “social-ontic foundations of social-scientific understanding”. The difficulty or rather impossibility of pointing out the impact of “social influence” on thought incl. what is deemed as scientific thought is highlighted. Reference is made to the significant Jooish thinker Husserl [[He definitely was not like your – of recent decades – typical JOO-tard, who thinks e.g. it’s “normal” for 1% or 2% of the population to hold 10% or 20% or 30% or 40% or 50%+ of elite positions, whereas when e.g. 60% or 90% of the population being white holds 45% or 65% or 80% or 95% of elite positions, that that somehow constitutes “white supremacy” or “white privilege”, whereas pointing out very real GROSS DISPROPORTIONATLITY as FACTS and FACTUAL/ACTUAL Primitive Secret Society-Banking-Finance-Corporations-etc. Privilege and Supremacy (incl. the Satanic Circus Monkey Compound and Bunker having FULLY SHUT NON- DIVERSE and ACTUALLY-FACTUALLY RACIST ZIO BORDERS with Satanic-Supremacist Orientation and Purpose, is somehow “bad” and “anti-Satanic”). Well, if I am a Hellene-Roman, why would I give a FUCK about anti-Satanism, UNLESS I HAVE BEEN FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA-LOBOTOMISED? I am not a fucking SATANIST!!! I only care about anti-Hellenism/Romanism, you ABSOLUTELLY DUMB FUCKING AND OR EVIL RETARDS ... ]] ... and his investigations into the roots, so to speak, of scientific thought and conceptuality. In any event, the semi-great Joo, couldn’t unlock the “mystery” and left his “lifeworld” and ethics-inspired “ideal community of communication”, as it were, “hanging in the air” incl. for the Super-BULL-SHITTING TEUTON GOTH HUN KRAUT, Heidegger, to ruminate upon rumination upon ruminations so as also not to arrive at the crux of the matter, as we shall see at the end of this sub-section. Discussion then quickly turns to the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives as it relates to understanding. The social scientist, in trying to understand social action, uses the same social-ontically pre-given equipment as any other person in the “ordinary or normal” course of life. However, in P.K.’s case, the social scientist is not “into vulgar sociology” where he, she or it projects their own personal values onto societies and cultures under observation, but it is a matter of the social-ontic phenomenon, common to all human beings, of the mechanism of the social relation, which is understood in terms of separative scientific abstraction, and obviously not as being and acting in the actual, real social space. And it is precisely this social-ontic component or dimension which is necessary to understand foreign/alien lifeworlds, and which neither waited to find expression in either historicism or Max Weber or any kind of methodological formula, for instance, but had always existed in humans, and was clearly expressed e.g. in Thucydides, i.e. the – as it were – getting into the position (and standing in the shoes) of the Other ... Understanding, of course, it not the only means for engaging in social science, but understanding as the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can only be at home in the social sciences. Two problem areas are referred to involving, inter alia, quantitative and qualitative analyses, the unintended consequences of action, social facts, and, the old distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities, as well as the shortcomings of methodological atomism.

OH! MY FUCKING GOD – HOW ABOUT THIS!!! (paraphrasing): the objective social fact is the point of view, not the ontic matter ...


“Statistical and quantifying procedures or form-related (i.e. formal) thought or intellectual necessities (typification (i.e. rendering into types or classification under typifying forms) and formalisation, thought experiments and the hypothetical isolation of factors for the investigation, detection or ascertainment of causal interrelations and contexts) bring the natural and the social sciences closer together than the ontic constitution, composition or texture of the corresponding fields or areas [[of both the natural and the social sciences]] seemed to allow this in the old historicism.”


“Simultaneously, the advancing or progressive historicisation of the natural sciences made clear that in their (i.e. the natural sciences’) formation and development, not merely an – in itself – categorially unchangeable subject pertaining to the theory of knowledge, but at least just as much, a variable or changing historical-social subject, is massively or all-out involved, so that also in this respect, the ontic difference between the natural and social sciences could be relativised or seen in a different light.” (See P.K.’s “Science, Power and Decision”).


“Finally, the much conjured-up or invoked same-kindedness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) of the subject and the object in the social sciences must be understood with the necessary differentiations and limitations or restrictions. As a social subject, man does not stop being a piece of nature, which is subject to the same kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities) of Nature, – something which also influences his social behaviour. And his same-kindedness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) with the object of his social-scientific study indeed constitutes the presupposition, prerequisite and precondition of an understanding (cognitive) apprehension of this object, but by no means the guarantee for the content-related correctness or rightness of this apprehension. (Were this so, then we would call the social sciences rather than the natural sciences, the “exact sciences”:) The difference between the certainly existing and present presupposition or prerequisite and precondition, and the by no means certain guarantee, corresponds precisely with the difference between the form-related (i.e. formal) and the content-related level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The same-kindedness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) of subject and object enables or makes social-scientific knowledge possible, but it does not make it easy (or does not facilitate it).”

The social scientist shares with the humans/objects he observes the mechanism of the social relation as the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, but obviously not the natural scientist re: his objects of observation/study/etc.. ... In the social sciences, “knowledge about the possibility of content-related differences vis-à-vis the Other already belongs to the form-related (i.e. formal) equipment of the consciousness of the I (ego).”

“The growing and increasing imponderability and incalculability of subjectivity and the refinement of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives go hand in hand.” [[So, that’s why Judas-Satan-ZIO-Book, JOOGLE and JOO-TOOB etJuDasCetera etJuDasCetera etJUdAsCetera (along with all related Protestant, Papist, Atheist and Cock-Sucking Allies (i.e. Mammonised ZIO-COST DEVILS)), or in other words, as the Professor from Chicago says “soft power” ZIO-USA-Style ... wants to “get into” and or control and or at least massage “everyone’s mind” “softly and suggestively and more heavily and emotionally and every other way imaginable” so that the massified-atomised FREAK-SHOW ZOMBIE-PARADE can go on, which is also probably connected to Fluoride in the water and that Great Line said (if I remember well) by THE GREAT STERLING HAYDEN (great fucking actor) about the FLUORIDE IN THE WATER (if he said it, because I could be wrong!) in The Great Kubrick’s (JOOBRICK’S) Dr. Strangelove circa 1964 ...]]

And this ultimately relates to trying to determine the position of the Other within the Friend-Foe spectrum as regards motives and aims etc., which, of course, is not an issue in relation e.g. to gravity and a falling body.

Those who refuse the possibility of methodical understanding based on the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, talk of an irrational, quasi-mystical “empathy (or insight)” or “intuition”, which is then contrasted to the so-called advantages of rational-behaviouristic transparency, as is the habit of Anglo-Saxons and their German followers, who want to rid themselves of the “irrationalism” of their own HUN-KRAUT-TEUTONIC-GOTHIC ULTRA BARBARIAN [[I am trying to be funny!!!]] heritage pertaining to the history of ideas.

P.K. goes on to discuss the breaking up of understanding into behaviouristic categories and, in the process, of using and applying the Covering-Law-Model, and the serious shortcomings of such theoretical efforts, as they, inter alia, don’t get to the social-ontic crux of the matter in relation to the full gamut of reality. The danger of solipsism and inability to understand the Other, can only be overcome if the I (ego) does not restrict itself to its own thought content and experiences but operates fully within what social-ontic formally makes available of assuming and taking on the perspective(s) of the Other or others. The Other always has the same capacity or potentiality for understanding as the I (ego), because all humans share the same formal capabilities to understand the Other’s different thought contents (this does not of course mean that understanding necessarily takes place, particularly when reflection on the part of the I (ego) does not take place).

Psychological needs and wishes as regards independence, security and optimism in respect of goal/end etc. “kick in” when the I (ego) hopes and expects that the Other will view things like the I (ego).

The I (ego) has to reflect interpretively upon its own acts of consciousness as regards meaning, and obviously also in respect of the Other’s acts of consciousness. So, only discontinuous segments from the Other’s streams of consciousness can only be apprehended (cf. Schütz’s excellent analysis + Husserl ... (= SuperJoo Time!)). There cannot be an “original presence” of the Other’s consciousness in the I/ego’s consciousness. So, the process of understanding, and in particular social-scientific understanding (even more so than topical, current intersubjective understanding) must engage in reconstruction, reflection, interpretation etc. as to the Other against the background of a context pertaining to meaning as well as re: perspectivity, interests, interpreting external/outer signs of “behaviour” and objective situations incl. to interpret motives and goals/ends etc..

Understanding is no “irrational” operation and it cannot be unreflected immediacy, given that man as the genus, man/human being, is an animal rationale (inter alia, engaged in understanding) as regards (one of) his key distinguishing feature(s) vis-à-vis other animals, and hence the crux of the opposition between “rationalists” and “irrationalists” is TOTAL BULLSHIT revolving around subjectively chosen content-related pre-decisions, since all humans have and share in social-ontological-anthropological rationality as compared to non-human animals.

There is no necessary connection between “irrationalism/intuition” and “genius” or methodical/methodological-rational rules and scientific observation.

The great Max Weber knew this and thus combined the ideal type with “phantasy”. On the other hand, nothing as regards understanding “just happens intuitively”, and reflection is always absolutely necessary just as much in social-scientific understanding as in understanding the Other. P.K. goes into how (also according to Weber) abstractions are inevitable, and that apart from thinking in strict mathematics, one cannot base one’s thought on a sameness with the thought of the Other. Interpreting (i.e. interpretive) apprehension of supra-individual constructs and contexts of meaning (“average (or mean) types”), of historical events – but also of the meaningful action of individuals, is adjusted and regulated (or put in order) ... Methodical/methodological understanding shows or contains the basic features which characterise every ideal type, however over and above that, such basic features structure already the pre-scientific apprehension of alien experiencing as (or of) going through the living or lives of the Other and of others), that is, the social-ontically pre-given assumption and taking on/over of perspectives ... so, there’s no getting out of reflection and abstractions, selections, generalisations, types etc..

And the researcher usually cannot escape value judgements and corresponding kinds of censorship or distortions ... And hence, we come to Weber’s “value relation”, that is, a decision on the, in general, or on each and every respective occasion, values of knowledge (i.e. what is worth knowing), and it follows that the personal talent and learning of the researcher as regards “irrational” extra-methodical (i.e. extra-methodological) presuppositions of knowledge become crucial.

Integral to) socially living human subjectivity are: meaning, end (goal) and means, (the) orientation of action to the supposed reactions of Others, action in concrete and only in concrete situations. Understanding succeeds only to the extent it is capable of covering – in its gradual (or stage-by-stage) extension – all these aspects one after the other, i.e. consecutively ... And P.K. comes to Weber’s famous distinction between “topical, current, relevant” understanding, which refers exclusively to the inherent meaning of an acting, act or action, which makes this what it is, irrespective of who functions as the actor. Explaining (cognitive) understanding, however, strives and endeavours to put in order and classify the topical, current, relevant or objective meaning of acting, action or the act in contexts of meaning (or meaningful interrelations), which can be outlined or delineated through the exploration of the subjective motivation or setting of a goal/end (end-goal setting and objective) of the actor ...

“During the investigation of or into the subjective end/goal and purposeful-expedient rationality of the actor, just as much as beforehand during the inquiry into and ascertaining or determination of his (i.e. the actor’s) goals/ends and motives, the person understanding obviously assumes and takes on/over the perspectives of the person to be understood. This is no longer necessary during the concluding phase of the understanding (cognitive) thought act (act of thought), in regard to which the objective rationality as to correctness (or accuracy) of the acting (action or act) is supposed to or ought to be judged and evaluated.” ... [[= A distinction is made between subjective end-goal-purposeful/expedient rationality and objective as to correctness (or accuracy) rationality (Unterschieden wird diesmal zwischen subjektiver Zweckrationalität und objektiver Richtigkeitsrationalität).]] ... And so original aims can be compared with means and final results etc. in the analysis of the final/“final” concrete situation under investigation ...


“Subjective rationality and objective rationality as to correctness (and accuracy) can – it is understood – be investigated only with the help of ideal-typical constructions, whose rational structure, however, may not be confused or confounded with the real structure of real acts or actions (kinds of acting); precisely for the understanding of “irrational” acts or actions (kinds of acting), are rational means of help and assistance needed.”

And, of course, all social-scientific knowledge, including causal explanation, apart from all the abstractions, selections, ideal types etc. used, will have to have a confirmatory relationship with empirical testing and verification, and logical consistency, just as in the natural sciences.

We learn about the mainly (not well-read) Anglo-Saxon positivists misunderstanding the “irrationalist” Dilthey ... and that the Anglos couldn’t understand the difference between the fundamental separation between the natural sciences and the humanities (sciences of the spirit/intellect) (i.e. that the latter involves humans who as objects of investigation also have and share in a human perspective), and there being a fatal dichotomy inside humanities, which Dilthey, of course, never meant there was since the natural sciences too had to constitute a construct of abstract-conceptual thought, because the deep ontological chasm between its object, subject matter and human being (t)here (or existence) can only be bridged in this manner of abstract conceptualisation/science – and not in actual fact and reality ... and it turns out that Dilthey’s “experience as (or of) going through life” was by and large misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Foul Men and their JoOisH friends, especially as regards Dilthey’s mature thought and his multi-dimensional view of understanding. The crux of the matter is that experience and thought, volition/will and thought, sensory perception and understanding etc. cannot be ultimately and permanently separated ... the passions are always in some way entwined with or relate to the intellect, and vice versa, etc., etc., etc..

Attention then turns to Dilthey and one’s own personal experience not sufficing to understand both ourselves or others. Something more is needed and takes place for a higher understanding, which again relates to the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and a “particular personal genius, ingenuity or brilliance”, which, though, does not have to be (i.e. is not necessarily) lost in the “irrational” ... “This binding or tying of genius, ingenuity or brilliance to a technique is supposed to vouch for and guarantee that the understanding (cognitive) humanities (i.e. sciences of the spirit and intellect), being far from renouncing or abjuring rational thought, can achieve “the objectivity of scientific knowledge”. Understanding leads “from the narrowness and subjectivity of experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life” to the region “of the whole and of the general” or of “general truths”; understanding demands and requires “for its completion (and perfection), systematic knowledge or knowing””.

The greatest weakness of Dilthey’s argumentation regarding the prerequisites or preconditions of understanding consists in the un-reflected (i.e. lacking in reflection) to and fro, back and forth between the social-ontic level of the diachronic-universally historical (or world-historical), and, the social-historical level of each and every respective culture and society coming into question and being considered.”

“The identity (i.e. equal and same nature) of the spirit-intellect as such and in general, that is, in its generally valid and applicable form-related (i.e. formal) structure, can, therefore, only make up (or deliver) the necessary, not the sufficient condition of the “finding again of the I (ego) in the You”; it does not in the least vouch for or guarantee the understanding of content: the Eskimo is not in a position to understand the Zulu’s culture in terms of content, although he has social-ontically at his disposal the same equipment.”

KEY = to ALWAYS bear in mind the difference between the social-ontological and the social-historical way of looking at things.

“We can assume why Dilthey did not bear the said difference between social-ontological and social-historical consideration in mind. The dividing line, which dominated his thought, was that between the natural sciences and the sciences of the intellect and spirit (i.e. the humanities), between the ontic heterogeneity of subject and object in the former (natural sciences), and, the ontic homogeneity of the subject and the object in the latter (humanities).”

Dilthey inherited his said shortcoming from historicism, e.g. the great historian Droysen, though neither made the mistake of viewing intuition as being capable of achieving understanding generally and universally. “Historical understanding is “just as much synthetic as analytical, just as much induction as deduction”, whereas “immediate and direct intuition” takes place only during the “understanding” of certain factual circumstances, which, though, clearly differs from the “logical mechanism of understanding””.

The discussion now turns from the Great Dilthey and Super-All-Time-Great Weber to the also Great Simmel, who with his JooIsh- ZIO brilliance provided some necessary conceptual clarity [[rather than obfuscating things like NEARLY ALL JOOS INVARIABLY DO IN THEIR ZIO-SATANIC-MAMMONIC DEVIL-EVIL-EVIL-DEVIL-SATANIC-CIRCUS-MONKEY-JU-DAS FASHION ...]].

What is meant here is the distinction between topical, current or relevant understanding, and, explaining (i.e. explanatory) understanding.

Understanding others is not like 2 + 2 = 4, where all humans understanding think in the same way. Consequently, for non-mathematical thought, typifications become necessary, as well as agreement as to type of experience with the Other at the level and in the manner of reflection (and, hence, linear psychological projections [[otherwise known as PSYCHOPATHIC ABSOLUTELY FRUIT-LOOP INSANE LUSTING FOR POWER AND MONEY JOOs AND THEIR FRIENDS AND OR ZOMBIES, PSYCHO-PATHOLOGISING OTHERS]] becomes a BIG FUCK YOU NO-NO for the purposes of scientific observation).

“In order for Caesar to be understood (or: In order to understand Caesar), one does not, therefore, have to be Caesar – such “congeniality” could in fact vitiate, impair or reduce the sharpness, clarity and depth of understanding: because even if the I (ego) finds its own experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life with certainty in the Other, who guarantees that the I (ego) also understands itself away from or beyond all bias, prejudice and self-satisfaction, complacency or smugness.” Also: the – for the most part – comparatively important thinker R. G. Collingwood, because of 1930s anti-fascist polemical zeal in combatting German “irrationalism”, fucked up by taking the position that one must be Caesar to understand Caesar ...

“Simmel touched upon the social-ontic origin or provenance of social-scientific understanding, when he opined that the latter (social-scientific understanding) differs from daily inter-subjective understanding only “gradually i.e. by degrees”, or “quantitatively”.” [[GO TO THE FULL TEXT OF THE TRANSLATION TO FIND OUT WHAT ELSE SIMMEL GOT RIGHT!!!]]

As to be expected, Heidegger comes along to shit all over Simmel’s good work by removing the Joo’S absolutely correct social-ontological intimations re: understanding, in order for the Full-of-SHIT Teutonic-Hun-Kraut-Germano-GOTH to go on and on and on with his Teutonic-Hun-Kraut-Germano-GOTH Super BuLLsHIT.

So, what Heidegger in his GENERAL STATE OF PONTIFICATING LONG-WINDED BULLCRAP missed is that “only understanding in the social-ontological sense of mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives could, through its reflectivity, which must be intensified in the intersubjective relation, enable and qualify man for higher achievements in language and thought”. AND SO HEIDEGGER – IN A NUTSHELL – OVERLOOKS BOTH THE SPECTRUM AND THE MECHANISM OF THE SOCIAL RELTION, IN EFFECT, THE SOCIAL RELATION ITSELF, AND NOT UNLIKE NIETZSCHE (AND EVEN THE JOO PSYCHOPATH FROOD, I MEAN FREUD), THEORISES AND SPINS ENDLESS SHIT IN A SOCIAL VACCUM (THOUGH NIETZSCHE DEFINITELY HAD VERY HIGH ENTERTAINMENT VALUE, AS WELL AS HAVING A REAL KNACK FOR THE FRIEND-FOE SIDE OF THINGS) ...

Gadamer and talk of “tradition” also sidesteps the fundamental social-ontological aspect of understanding, which must take into consideration the various actors understanding and interpreting phenomena vis-à-vis one another both as to the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation, e.g. whether now primitive man swings his club against primitive man, whether the refined use of knife and fork is supposed to signal and be indicative of social distinctions, or whether tractors cultivate the soil. P.K. finishes this also extraordinary subsection with further discussion about the age-old problem of “tradition” and how what is really crucial is the interpretations and the power struggles involved in understanding matters regarding institutional and habitual crystallisations of “tradition” re: the mechanism and spectrum of the social relation on each and every respective occasion. The contradistinction of “community vs. society”, which suggests the impression that only during the transition from socially and intellectually-spiritually immobile agrarian society to all-round mobile industrial society, a break has taken place in the matter of “tradition”, is simply wrong; “tradition” had always been a matter of complaint (i.e. interpretation) since the ancient world, and had always contained more and less reflective elements, and never was necessarily pure fiction, etc..

Chapter IV, Section 1E(a), in three pages, not only decimates the language-communication bullshit-ideologies of Western mass democracy (centred in Satanic Circus Monkey-related ZIO-USA), but also provides the perfect introduction to sub-sub-section (b) on the Other and end(s)-means, and to sub-sub-section (c): the Habermas (and very funny, up to hilarious) “communication” sub-sub-section, where the “ethical impulse” reigns supreme (and we all should know by now that strict science cannot possibly be an ethical-normative exercise ... ) ...

You can read the details yourselves in the translated text, but the crux of the matter is that people can use language and communicate as much as they want, but taking into account human subjectivity, and the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, as well as the Friend-Foe spectrum of the social relation, ... if I punch you in the face or if you kill me, or if I dig a hole to bury you, or if you work day and night like a proletarian or coolie in a sweat shop or factory to provide e.g. cheap running shoes or mobile phones to “Western/White people”, or if I stick my cock in your cunt, or if you buy me some chocolates to eat because you love me, etc., etc., etc., then it becomes quite clear that words are nothing without the bodies existing first and always (or put another way: cybernetic systems theories and even respectable theorists like G.H. Mead with behaviouristic leanings (as we saw previously) fucked up continually be confusing science with ethics in their attempts to extinguish (or otherwise temper or modify) the philosophy of the subject and anthropology (+ the Friend-Foe spectrum of the social relation as it relates to motives, ends and action plans of actors, as well as to the discrepancies which do not infrequently occur between what is said and what is done (i.e. action rather than just communication)), with conceptual decisionism and conceptual contrivance). Language and communication cannot be separated from man (as (in part) part of and (in part) separate from the animal kingdom/Nature), and man has absolutely necessary material-natural needs which involve physical action (which is more often than not accompanied by signs, symbols, language/communication). Only a society of mass Konsum and Hedonismus (with GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE JOOish (ZIO, Satanic, HEE-BROO, JU-DAS) input) could possibly ever believe that the exchange of signs etc. has no “guaranteed” material basis (such as access to raw materials, clear trade routes, cheap consumer goods mostly made by others as super-exploited cheap labour, raw military power, etc.) ... The giving of meaning, choosing and understanding might e.g. be considered part of communication, rather than action, but invariably such social phenomena are related in some way to acts by humans as flesh and blood ...

“The hard core or nucleus of acting, action and the act remains socially the ultima ratio (i.e. the final reason, argument, reckoning, account or last resort), irrespective of how the ratio (Reason) of social theoreticians thinks about that.”

And communication is thus properly defined “as the “medium of social interaction” (Park-Burgess; 1921), whose shape and form is determined by the level at which interaction takes place, i.e. the level of sensorial perception, of feelings and of emotions or of ideas and of symbols.”

Death to the Satanic Circus Monkey!!! Death to SATAN!!!!!

Next is Chapter IV, Section 1, sub-section b, which explores the Other as subject and as object or as end/goal and as means, with particular attention being paid to the mass-democratic lead-up to Habermas-related normativistic “communication theory”, which is the main focus of the next sub-section. Here, further – preparatory to Habermas – theoretical terrain is explored, with, inter alia, examination not of cybernetics and informatics leading to systems theory (already previously covered), but of phenomenological and (normativistic) dialogical theoretical precursors and their various theoretical presumptions and shortcomings (the rather silly notion that the Other as human subject is an end-in-itself, and should under no circumstances be looked at or used as a means for the achievement of other ends and goals; but also differences are pointed to between phenomenological-dialogical, and, communicative approaches), ... including various – kind of likable, kind of (up to super) important and or ridiculous – figures, either in detail or in passing, such as da (as always, grossly over-represented) JOOS: Buber, Husserl (incl. the master and servant example), Simmel, Schütz, Löwith; + Jaspers, Heidegger (whose HUN-KRAUT-GOTH-TEUTON “monlogicalism” was opposed by (Husserlish-)Buber ZIO-JOO-HEEBROO “dialogicalism”, even though there were points of convergence between Heidegger and the dialogicians, and notwithstanding that Husserl always retains some JUSTIFIABLE ZIO SUPREMACY in the field of theory given that he was also a German and not just a ZIO (JOO)), Theunissen (who was secondary supervisor of P.K.’s Ph.D, if I’m not mistaken), v. Wiese, Nisbet, Hegel, Valéry, Sartre (who in his maturity and talk of “struggle” comes much closer to social-ontology and the mutuality of subject/object re: perspective taking, than in his earlier existentialistic smart-arse phase) and Charles Taylor.

[[Note: footnote 212 points to the philosophical/theoretical backdrop to the present-day Anglo-American-EE-ZIO-Freak Show (Atomised, Massified FeminoFaggotism, Drug Taking, Otherisation, Self-Racism, Auto-Genocide, Hedonismus, Konsum, FUCKED-IN-THE-HEAD FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMISATION-ZOMBIFICATION etc. etc. etc.), and like everything associated with Modernity from the 16th/17th centuries, the start was made by Protestants, Papists, Anglicans, Secularists, Atheists et al. before da JOOs joined in and GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY took over, particularly through Satanic Circus Monkey ZIO-USA from c. 1913, but esp. after WW2.]]

There’s also reference to, inter alia:

1) Kant, and how mass-democratic intersubjectivity tried to do what “the bourgeois philosopher of the Subject” Kant would never have thought of, i.e., the (social-)ontologically founding of ethics, a matter to be examined in detail in the next sub-section.

2) the banalities of cultural criticism or the critique of culture where various sides (JOOs, Buberists, “(cultural) Marxist” Horkheimer-Adorno-ZIO USA ideologues, Heideggerians, “NAZIs”, et al.) seek “authenticity” but – from a strict scientific point of view – just spin BULLSHIT in order to justify either their own tribe’s GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE accumulations, concentrations and crystallisations of forms of power and wealth, or their power claims, even though they know they are DEFEATED and won’t ever “come to power”, etc., etc., etc..   

3) CLASSIC P.K. QUOTE: » Sie impliziert aber, daß die sozialontologische Ebene tiefer als die ethische liegt, also moralische und unmoralische Einstellungen, wie auch immer man sie definieren mag, gleichermaßen umfaßt – und gerade weden der vorhandenen formal-strukturellen Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen ihnen. Die Ineinssetzung der beiden Ebenen, die uns auch in Gestalt der direkten Gleichsetzung von „echter“ sozialer Beziehung und Freundschaft begegnete, bildet einen der üblichsten und ältesten Kunstgriffe ethisch-normativen Denkens, sobald es auf der Suche nach letzten objektiven Argumenten aufs Ontologische übergreifen muß.« TAKE THAT! POW! WHAM! SMASH!

4) FOOTNOTE 247 IS ALSO A FUCK-YEAH CLASSIC: “Hegel’s master, who is completely fixed upon the pleasure of the thing, and uses the servant/slave merely as a means, in order to come into (i.e. attain and achieve) pleasure, misjudges and fails to appreciate the priorities so much, that in contrast to the servant/slave, he appears to be unreal (i.e. beyond and not aware of reality); thus, the spoiled and careless, reckless son of the master might have behaved or might behave rather than the master himself, who knew how to and was able to subjugate the servant/slave and keep the servant under subjugation. Social realities stand and are nearer to Xenophon’s tyrant, who imagines and visualises during sleepless nights how every citizen thinks, and how he would probably react to this or that action of his tyrannical reign and government (Phänomenologie des Geistes, IV, A, bzw. Hieron, ch. II-VI).”

5) ANOTHER FUCK YEAH P.K. CLASSIC QUOTE (S. 405 OF GERMAN TEXT): “The Other can, in fact, be a “means” even when the I (ego) therefore looks at, considers and handles, treats him/it as an “end-in-itself” in order to be able to put to the proof and prove that it (the Other) is thus, or should or ought to be thus (i.e. an “end-in-itself”). The Other becomes and turns into an end-in-itself, therefore, as the case of the application of the general principle “the Other is an end-in-itself”. This is no paradox, but the ideational background or backdrop of every educational and paedagogical dictatorship exercised consciously or unconsciously, mildly or wildly, directly or indirectly, in good or in bad faith. Whoever wants to educate, in relation to that, other people so that they hold and regard people to be ends-in-themselves, cannot eo ipso class or classify the to-be-educated person in his present state of affairs as an end-in-himself, otherwise it would be absurd and non-sensical to want to change him “with good intent” and “for his own good”; precisely the shaping, formative urge, drive itch and longing, however, cannot help but reify and objectify people.” WHICH MEANS THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS “PURE” ABSOLUTELY SELFLESS ALTRUISM AND PHILANTHROPY, AND THAT ALL RELATONS BETWEEN PEOPLE RELATE TO SOME FORM OF POWER, EVEN WHEN SOMEONE IS BEING “HELPED, LOVED” OR HAVING THINGS DONE FOR “THEIR OWN GOOD” ETC..

Overall, it is a fairly enjoyable sub-chapter, which reiterates that there is no “original, true, genuine, authentic” state of being (of I and You), where everyone is just a subject and end-in-himself, nor can everyone just be objectified and just be an object like Silly Sartre thought before he became less silly in his maturity, for even servants in the master-servant relationship have actual subjectivity, etc., etc., etc.. All the other “(psychological) shit” re: shame, angst, fear etc. is existent shit, but not social-ontologically existent, which includes the mechanism (and spectrum) of the social relation without any content attached at the social-ontological level of observation/abstraction (in respect) of human behaviour, action and affairs.

Chapter IV, Sec. 1E(c) is an at times hilarious exposé of some of the ridiculous positions held by “Europe’s greatest social scientist and philosopher” of the second half of the mass-democratic Hedonismus-Konzum ZIO-KOST-worshipping 20th century, whose thought is compared to, inter alia, ... Mohammed (as cited by a JOO).  

Habermas does refer to American pragmatism (incl. Peirce’s absurd “consensus theory of truth”, and to the semi-great G.H.Mead), for anyone interested, particularly in relation to “the religious motive of alliance and confederacy” which ultimately is found underlying all forms of ethical rationalism. There’s also mention of the semi-great supa JOO, Husserl (incl. his “life world” concept), being a typical JOO (read the opening paragraph of this sub-chapter for details!)... There’s also the usual bullshit (or JOO-shit) of tying Reason to ponderability and calculability (as long, “of course”, as no-one touches bank, corporate and other GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ZIO-MAMMON-profits etc.).

“The theory of communication sets as its task, indeed, already at the beginning, that which the old and new theory of the subject wanted to achieve at the end.” (So, basically Habermas is a variation on a theme by Husserl (and not so much Horkheimer-Adorno, who compared to the semi-great supa JOO, Husserl, are secondary and derivative over-rated minor (but not totally silly or useless and retarded) JOOs).

We learn, also, that notions of the philosophy of the subject and “the religious motive of alliance and confederacy” in ideal “communication communities” go back the radical Kantianism of Hegel (and Fichte). Reference is also made to a real sociologist (and not a ZIO-USA “post-modern” academic (JOO or not) clown) like R. E. Park, and to the always well-intentioned “democratic decisionist” Jaspers, as well as to game and system theories, and the SUPA-ZIO-ETHICIST JOO Buber.

And, of course, without even realising it, Habermas’s communicative vs. strategic action dichotomy, is simply an (in effect) admission of the friend-foe spectrum of the social relation, which his theory is supposed to “take care of” – AAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.

The great Max Weber got the social action/meaning-assumption and taking on/over of perspectives absolutely (social-ontologically) right, something DA (in part, at least) JOO-inspired ethicist Habermas could never grasp.

So, “what’s going on” is a regurgitation and variation on a theme of the critique of culture’s humanity-technology dichotomy, and community-society contradistinction, with a bit of smart-arse lifeworld-system shit thrown into the Habermas mix.

Things with Habermas get even sillier and more ridiculous, and this is representative of the overall GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY JOO-LED under FREAK-SHOW SUPA-FREAK ZIO-USA LOBOTOMISED RETARD MULTI-KULTI DIE-VERSIFY ZIO-KOST WORSHIPPING SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY BIG TENT IMPERIALISTIC CIRCUMSTANCES effort to make everyone think that reality is the language one uses:

“And here again the search for “realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness” and “originality (or naturalness and the unspoilt state)” is made noticeable, whilst – without historical-genetic(al) or empirical speech analyses – it is ensured or assured that language use oriented towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement) is the “original mode”.”

And so the Habermasian theoretical ideological inanities continue with the ascribing of an inherent “good” ethical dimension to interlocutors based on understanding (being confused with agreement), truthfulness etc. etc. etc. (even though the concession is made “that on occasion the strategically acting person also pursues his aims, yet in principle, hushing [[things]] up and hypocrisy belong to his trade”), so that tenured professors can spend their whole lives spinning mountains of word-shit, i.e. bullshit, and totally avoid basic truths of human existence such as the friend-foe spectrum and GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE accumulations, concentrations and crystallisations of forms of power and wealth under conditions of Anglo-Franco-Germano-American(-Russo-Italo-Dutch-etc.) historical capitalism(s) in the hands of the representatives of SATAN and MAMMON, i.e. JOOs. The semi-great American G.H. Mead was ambiguous about the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, whereas the ethicist Habermas only sees understanding as meaning consent, as if he were just another JOO seeking to conceal the GROSS DISPROPORTIONALITY in the possession of ZIO-JOO wealth and power, (nearly) always supported by FOUL MEN-Englishmen, Anglo-Americans, Frogs, Krauts et al..

And the Habermasian Bla-Bla-Bla continues with further shit-spinning by now attempting to make up for truthfulness and understanding (in communication, up to agreement) not drawing an absolutely clear dividing line between strategic and communicative action, by supposedly drawing such a dividing line by means of the critique of each and every respective made claim of validity, which allegedly specifically characterises communicative action, when it applies to all kinds of action. For understanding ultimately touches upon the ultimate questions and problems of meaning and legitimation, which can hardly be separated from questions and problems of identity and recognition (i.e. power) (e.g. “that is God’s will”, “ethics demands that”, “rationality commands that”). So, rationality as logic drawing ultimate conclusions, incl. in light of (historical) empirical reality, teaches us that there are no fixed values and there is no fixed content-related/filled rationality – something which, obviously, the SUPA ETHICIST Habermas will never admit, even if he understands it (= doubtful).

Communicative action is associated with freedom from dominant authority and the equality of the interlocutors, and anyone who knows how the real world operates, knows that that is more TOTAL HABERMASIAN JOO-ZIO-AND-ANGLO-AND-GERMANO-UNDER-THE-ANGLO-ZIO-USA-LIKE BULLSHIT. All societies operate with dominant ideologies/beliefs-etc. and dominant frameworks of discourse, whether (much) (more) authoritarian, or (much) (more) “free” (for individuals and e.g. groups of money-Mammon Satanists etc.).

“What, therefore, the theory of communicative action offers in reality is a description of the mode and manner of the function and existence of an ideal community of communication, provided that it (i.e. such an ideal community of communication) can exist. It (i.e. the theory of communicative action), however, offers neither a proof that it (i.e. an ideal community of communication) can exist, nor a concrete direction for its realisation.”

Thus, in effect we’re getting a variation on “the ontological proof of God: from the attribute of perfection, reality or realisability must be derived and deduced as the inseparable quality, property or characteristic of perfection. Said more banally, it is a matter of a more extensive version of the age-old interweaving of Is and Ought, of which ethical-normativistic thought as a rule makes use, in order to be founded (and established) with ultimate arguments. The “real, genuine or authentic” and “true” being/Is, is here the “original mode” of communication, as it allegedly arises or is produced already out of the “original mode” of language”. Reality, however, – for anyone who cares to look out of their Bubble/Ivory Tower/Window – is far more prosaic.

“In actual fact, only the certainty that all partial communities would have to – already on the basis of the following of and adherence to (or compliance with) the same discursive (methodical) procedure – come across the (one) truth, and, in the course of this, could never err, can found, justify or give reasons for hope in peace amongst them (i.e. the said partial communities). Habermas is of the one (and same) opinion with the prophet Mohammed: “my community will never agree upon an error”.” AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

“If the course of communicative action is dependent on its preconditions and prerequisites, what determines then, these preconditions and prerequisites? The answer means simply (or: is simple): the decision of the actor, as the theoretician, of course, likes to imagine or visualise [[things]].”


P.K. then proceeds to brilliantly round off this sub-section by showing how (liberal) parliamentarism (aka “democracy” with the so-called “sovereignty of the people/folk”) is a matter, ultimately and principally, not of consensus after “dominance-free” “rational discussion” (i.e. “free” of dominant authority), but of taking a decision, and that cannot but (also) relate to unequal relations of power (from cabinets to ... primitive secret societies and deep states etc.).

“The ethically motivated theoretician opines and believes, with good and clear conscience, that people as actors or factotums in his rational plan, design or blueprint, are being served well and correctly, and they are “real, genuine or authentic subjects”. But precisely because people are, anyhow, real, genuine or authentic subjects, they do not fit into any plan, design or blueprint.”

Chapter IV, Section 1F, an excursus, takes a historical look at the development of a (philosophical) (at least in-part, if not fully theorised) understanding of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. Since ancient times, “pity” has been the way philosophers intimated that they were sort of, kind of aware of the reflectivity of the mechanism of the social relation, and later on the term “sympathy” came to the fore. The examples start with Marcus Aurelius, Homer and Aristotle, in regard to whom various circumstances of pity and (total) lack of pity are discussed in respect of the relationship of power between people, and the fact that the form-related/formal dimension of the mechanism of the social relation (as the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) remains the same in all circumstances. Next, we turn to SUPA FOUL-MAN Hobbes and his thoughts on Aristotle’s understanding of pity, and find not unlike DA GREAT FROG La Rochefoucauld, even whilst pitying, we are really also thinking of ourselves because we don’t want to be in the position of the person suffering etc.. However, the rise of the Enlightenment philosophy of sentiments, emotions and feelings meant that the reflectivity aspect was not properly considered, and ethicisation (compared to the all-time great Hobbes and La Rochefoucauld) became again the predominant mode of thinking in regard to pity, even though a not insignificant thinker like Mandeville was more than capable of making a valid point given that man for him was “essentially bad and evil”. The theoretical problems arose more prominently in those who saw man as “essentially good” and connected this with a zeal to found binding ethics, e.g. Hutcheson and Butler (and the notion of “compassion”, which lies somewhere between “pity” and “sympathy” (in the case of Hume)). However, the Enlightenment period overall provided no 20th century theory of interaction, as the main focus was from the point of view of the I (ego). And, so, P.K., commences his extensive discussion of the at least semi-great SUPA SCOT Hume with the telling and correct observation that “the minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations”. The discussion then proceeds as regards imagination, (weak and strong, disinterested and extensive) sympathy, immediate contagion/transmission, the “saving” of ethics in order to avoid the notorious SUPA SUPA DUPA FOUL MAN Hobbes ... comparison, pity, compassion, benevolence, hate/hatred, malice, schadenfreude, reflectivity, power relationships etc., with Hume nonetheless coming very close to a value-neutral explication of the mechanism of the social relation (with his various (reflective) intersubjective positionings relating to the (then prominent) anthropology of drives/urges and impulses touching upon the entire spectrum of the social relation and recognition), no matter how much he wanted to “dance around” Supreme Drunk ALL-TIME-SUPER-LEGEND BOGGEYMAN Hobbes ... with his rather Scotch Whiskey (have another glass) silly one-sided “comparisons”, disproved by the multi-dimensionality and complexity of reality. Adam Smith reflects more than Hume about the reflective nature and value-neutral concept of sympathy, but still hops around absolutely consistent theoretical ethical nihilism [[and rightly so, in one sense, because if you arrive there, and make too much noise about it, in the end, everyone is going to HATE and DESPISE YOU !!!! AAAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]. Next is D. Hartley’s variations on Da Theme in question incl. re: imagination and comparison, and this FOUL MAN in relation to sympathy implicitly alludes to the value-neutral mechanism of the social relation, without, of course, doing so explicitly (because then we have a value-nihilism “problem”, and he may well have saved himself the trouble of “going there” by good FOUL MAN common-sense survival “instinct” and self-preservation drives, urges, impulses). Scheler does something similar to Hartley using terms like “valency”, and P.K. does refer to DA JOO Scheler as a “philosopher”, so that’s worth noting, even though like a typical JOO, Scheler muddled things with ZIO-obfuscation-ethicisation, and did not call a spade, a spade, or a mouse, a mouse in regard to sympathy (as compassion or commiseration), love, spontaneity, suffering etc.. This excursus/digression finishes off with the at least semi-great and brainy-very smart cookie JOO, Husserl, and the also fairly smart non-JOO cookies, Hun-Teuton-Kraut-Goth Barbarian Theodor Litt, the multi-talented woe-man Sophie Bryant, the Yankee Doodle Dandy Charles Horton Cooley, and some rather (albeit not totally lucid) smarty pies: Phillip Mercer, and DA ARCH JOO-ESSA HAMBURGER. The concluding references to the Anglo-Saxon literature, includes empathy, self-observation, introspection and a reference ... to Freud ...












In Section 2 of Chapter IV, our focus shifts from the inner mechanism of the social relation to the social relation’s outer mechanism. Chapter IV, Section 2A(a) “Action: inner and outer/Action and social action” is like so much in The Political and Man before and after this sub-sub-section, an ABSOLUTE KNOCK OUT, with a whole series of invaluable social-theoretical gems as only P.K. has ever produced them. P.K. reminds us, again, of the important distinction between theoretical abstraction(s) for the purposes of theoretical understanding, and reality as a unified whole which works simultaneously and holistically at many levels, any in many various ways, and is not separated in the way the human mind uses abstractions in trying to understand human social reality. A social relation incl. interaction only eventuates when at least two subjects or actors are aware of each other. One (human) actor can be socially acting e.g. by thinking about other actors or other (human) social facts/phenomena, but without any specific social relation and interaction existing between actors, which requires outer/external acts (apart from the inner/internal mental acts) and a mutual awareness thereof. Outer act(ion)s, which are directed or turn to(wards) the Other without his (i.e. the Other’s) knowledge, always remain in the framework of social action without stepping over the threshold of the social relation stricto sensu. An actual social relation of interaction between actors means a constant positioning within the friend-foe spectrum of the social relation, always against the backdrop of pre-existing human society. P.K. goes on to distinguish between mental acts which remain within the (sub-)consciousness of the actor concerned, and those mental acts which are connected with interaction/the social relation. A mental act (or: mental acting or mental action) is something other than (the) acting (act or action) in mente (i.e. in the mind). What is the crucial point of distinction is a plan of action (which may involve the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives), or the lack thereof. Pre-rational or pre-reflective psychical activity raises issues to be discussed in a later (sub-)section. In mente mental acts do not have to involve action, just as action plans do not necessarily end up in outer action. There is a great surplus of imagined action vis-à-vis the real outer action taking place which will be discussed later.

There is, next reference to Max Weber and his defining of “social action” as pertaining to outer / external action (albeit in relation to “meaningful relatedness or reference”), and “social action” in P.K.’s (obviously (so to speak, more) correct view) being reflective mental acts, which indeed relate and refer to other subjects, without, however, – along with this reference –, being (necessarily) connected to the action plans of their bearer or outer/external action. In other words, a producer, e.g., could take into consideration the needs of consumers or other producers, without knowing them personally or interacting with them directly and mutually, and technically, we still have social action, as the aforesaid producer acts, produces etc. in relation to existing social relations, even though he is not directly interacting at that time with anyone in particular. Thus, Weber also wrongly understood prayers as not being social action, when obviously they are based on the above criteria of socially-related/referring (internal/inner) action. And a consequence of Weber’s error is that mass-psychological phenomena would be excluded from the social sciences. Another consequence is that the truly all-time great Max Weber did not distinguish between action (Handeln) and mere behaviour (bloßem Verhalten). Weber did, however, acknowledge purposefully not acting in order to bring about an event as social action.

P.K. then goes into further examples of mental acts relating to social action, incl. psychological compensation and phantasy. If every single mental act found expression in outer action, social life would be impossible. Mental acts of theoretical activity are distinguished from those mental acts relating to action plans, since the former can be completed without being outwardly acted upon, but remain social action since they have a social reference. In any event, there is always a surplus of mental acts/thought (with (possibly or probably) different meanings meant and different interpretations given), whether one acts outwardly or not.

Social action can be constituted by just a one-sided reference to meaning, whereas the social relation requires a mutual or reciprocal reference to meaning. In regard to the said mutuality as regards the social relation, Weber saw things correctly, but he erred only in his opinion that the transition from inner action to outer action had already been executed and carried out through the concept of social action. That is not the case, although, as we have said, social action is not necessarily acted out and does not necessarily take place in foro interno (i.e. mentally), but it can manifest itself in all its one-sidedness and unilaterality outwardly and externally, too (the example of the secret admirer is given, with the person being admired knowing nothing of the admiration). But a social relation requires outer/external action (irrespective of physical presence, but with the need at least of the exchanging of signs/symbolism) on both sides and the operation of both the mechanism and the spectrum of the social relation. The giving of signs and outer action are absolutely essential for the social relation. The social relation necessitates and requires as the sole form of action, by definition, the inner and the outer aspect, and exactly because of that, it (i.e. the social relation) is social-ontologically decisive and determinative. (There is a borderline social relation of mutual engrossment between two actors without outward signs being given, but such a relation is not socially or social-ontologically significant).

P.K. then refers to the crucial nexus between two subjects and the social world in general in displaying the centrality of the power relationship and the social-ontological primacy of outer and external action.

A distinction is made between that which in the realm of inner acts has an effect as pre-reflective intentionality, as well as outer acts (i.e. behaviour, strictly defined, e.g. coughing because of a cold), and, a concept of action, which has both inner (reflective, intention-related) as well as outer (motor) components (e.g. coughing to interrupt someone speaking), even though common language use does not make such a distinction. Action is always behaviour as well, but behaviour is not always a (necessary) concomitant of an action. For more details about the attributes of behaviour as compared to action, and as compared to various kinds of behaviours bordering on action, including in relation to culture and reflexes, study the sub-section carefully!

So, when we are dealing with action and intention (and not mere reflexive behaviour), the question why? arises as to intentions, which are regularly connected with planning ahead etc.. And what follows is the all-time best advice of all (by a Greek (Democritus)):

προβουλεύεσθαι κρεῖσσον πρὸ τῶν πράξεων μετανοεῖν

= it is better to be prudent before our acts, rather than regretting our acts. And another SUPA DUPA Greek, Aristotle, observed that humans distinguish themselves from non-human animals due to action (which involves rationality): «δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν = it is obvious that beasts have sense, but do not render social any act (or: do not engage in social action». (Beware, this does not mean that non-human animals are not social. They are not (human-)rationally social). And social action inevitably relates to a social relation.


Humans undeniably have biological-related traits to be found in the natural world and animal kingdom overall, which simply cannot be denied, unless one is into ideology and not science. However, the study of humans is not a matter of trying to ascertain “what, and to what extent what goes and belongs where” in respect of (elements from) the non-human natural and or biological world.

P.K. then explains the four points of view with regard to which the clear conceptual distinction between behaviour and action must be relativised in a manner which takes into account the realities on the social-ontological field.

1) Crucial in limiting (relatively spontaneous-reflexive) behaviour, and turning it into action, is the pressure of rationality and rationalisation, which, during the transformation of wishes and proclivities (inclinations or propensities) into practical intent(ion)s, as well as during the pursuit of these intent(ion)s, has an effect through the expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) choice of means on the basis of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the assessment of the situation. What is known as “irrationality” and uncontrolled behaviour is, nonetheless, still present.

2) A further expansion of the concept of rationality to include behaviour in regard to expressive elements or factors accompanying expedient action.

3) Intentionality builds an additional bridge between behaviour and action. Reference here is made to the semi-at least-supa-JOO, Husserl and to the fact that the classical philosophical problem of the so-called freedom of the will is bullshit.

4) Social reference and objective meaning also expand the notion of rationality.

P.K. then goes into how action in general is that field inside of which exactly all the aforesaid conceptual distinctions lose their sharp contours and are relativised. Vita contemplativa is a part of vita activa.

Quoting directly from P.K.. This stuff is fucking brilliant it is clearly betta than da sex ...

"As society in magno (i.e. on a large scale) can be comprehended as the sum of individuals and collective subjects, which are distributed as friends or foes across the entire spectrum of the social relation, and act accordingly, so too can the small society of theoreticians be imagined as an ensemble of gifted and educated, instructed, trained or cultivated subjects, who are grouped and behave like members of society in magno (i.e. on a large scale) and as bearers of the generally practised mode of acting, conduct or way of action or of the act in accordance with essentially similar points of view [[i.e. in regard to the friend-foe spectrum, etc.]]. Theory’s specific features or characteristics constitute the resultant of discussions, debates and clashes between specifically, in relation to that, talented and educated subjects, who make up and constitute a particular society and look into and deal with particular questions, and do not make up and constitute a simple reflection or mirroring of the social-political and ideological relations or correlation(s) of forces in society in magno (i.e. on a large scale)." In other words, vulgar (ZIO-JOO) sociology / ideology or vulgar Marxism are of no interest, from a strictly scientific point of view. "Moreover, the same relationship can be observed, mutatis mutandis, between theoretical and practical action in society, if one here wants to draw a conventional dividing line, [[just]] as between inner and outer action. There is, namely, a surplus of theory vis-à-vis praxis (practice), i.e. theory tolerates, suffers or brooks many more fantasies, illusions, conceits, contradictions or simply nonsense than everything which praxis (practice) may allow itself in relation to that (i.e. in relation to illusions, contradictions and nonsense); practical faux pas, lapses, aberrations and blunders are accordingly punished more harshly, whereas theoreticians can be certain of their fool’s licence (or freedom to be a fool), at least within certain boundaries, even under strict supervision."

"Furthermore, human action is more than human needs, i.e. we are capable of doing and do do much more than what is required to merely exist, creating (a hierarchy of) needs in the process. The individual person acting always acts in regard to a double quality or characteristic, namely, as a being or creature which cannot not act, and as a concrete bearer of action and of a decision, who can do or leave this or that. Man is only ever temporarily satisfied as to his needs. The resulting uncertainty and insecurity, which makes (more) difficult the inner guidance or direction of acting, and at the same time, seeks relief from, or relieving of, the tension/stress of existence in all kinds of rationalisations, goes back and is reduced, for its part, to two factors, and moves at two levels: anthropologically, it lies in (i.e. is due to) man’s openness to the world (or world openness) and the lack of security in respect of man’s instinct, and historically-sociologically, it lies in (and is due to) the in principle openness and changeability or mutability of all situations and positions in which socially living man may find himself. Action, therefore, in human life, cannot be avoided. Power is what a person can do and relates to what he can do vis-à-vis others (in an institutional or ideational hierarchy)."

Here we go again, all-time classic P.K. stuff !!!

"In all human societies, social hierarchy was hitherto connected with the form of the outer and external action practised by every actor, and indeed, in such a way or manner that completely and entirely above (i.e. at the top [[of the social hierarchy]]) stood that person who through minimal motor activity (mobility) could demand from other people maximal motor activity (mobility), irrespective of how this possibility was really (i.e. in reality or objectively) secured (or ensured). Culture began, in any case, with this possibility, which in sublimated speech was described as the victory of the spirit over physical strength and force." [[SO, IN MAMMON-SATAN SOCIETIES, THE REPRSENTATIVES OF SATAN, JOOZ, GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY CO-RULE, SINCE POWER CONCENTRATES AT THE TOP THROUGH NETWORKS OF MAMMONISM (MONEY) AND SATANISM (CENTRALISED STATE / DEEP STATE ANTI-CHRIST, ANTI-PATRIARCHAL BRAIN-WASHING, WASH, WASH, WASH ...). THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT ANGLO-SAXONS, AND WITHOUT BOTH THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ZIO-USA MASS DEMOCRACY (MASSIFICATION, ATOMISATION, URBANISATION, TECHNICISATION, OTHER-FREAKIFICATION, FEMINO-FAGGOTISM, DRUGS, FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-KOST LOBOTOMISATION, HEDONISMUS, KONZUM, ETC., ETC., ETC.).]]


"Now, action can in its various narrower and wider or more extensive meanings be contradistinguished to the individual act, action or kind of acting, whose extent, scope or range likewise can starkly (i.e. greatly) vary in accordance with each and every respective interesting (i.e. of interest) context. [[1]] Action as an anthropological category, [[2]] action as the overall and entire, total activity of a society in its historical being-so or being thus, [[3]] action as the sketch, model, blueprint, plan or project (in respect) of the life of an actor planning for the very long-term, or [[4]] action as the methodical organisation of a series of individual actions, acts or kinds of acting for the attainment and achievement of a certain end or goal, must [[all]] analytically be distinguished from one another, as much as they are also in general related as to essence or character (i.e. they are agnate, akin or all come from a common source)."




"However, man acts in respect of a form-related framework of thought and concepts of end(s), goal(s), and, means, which for their part, imply the thought-related or intellectual use of basic or fundamental categories like causality, identity and contradiction."

P.K. then discusses the “end(s)/goal(s)-means” schema, and how 1) neither actor nor observer can ever be certain all the time of the successful carrying out of intentions, and 2) there can be no list of all the cases of possible action, since action is situation-dependent. To acting (action or the act) belong not only its (i.e. acting’s) unintended consequences, but also its intentional (deliberate or on-purpose) ex post facto interpretations. There is mention of means (with a reference to the partly great Tönnies and to the great-great Clausewitz) and how sometimes in order to achieve limited ends, extreme means have to be used, etc..

Conceptually, action is the generic concept, but social-ontological priority is with social action, and above all, the social relation. Without subject-to-subject relations, there can be no subject to object relation, incl. man vis-à-vis nature or art or technology. "Social outer or external action is, in a social-ontological respect, the hard core of action and its (i.e. action’s) ultima ratio (i.e. final word / argument, the last resort or the last suitable means). What is acted out and takes place as action in foro interno (i.e. in the inner court (of justice and conscience)), remains socially irrelevant, as long as it does not find its expression through the means of external or outer action. On the overall field (or in the total area or sector) of action, cum grano salis (i.e. with a grain of salt), that which Clausewitz described in respect of war can be applied, that, it (i.e. action), namely, is a measuring of the intellectual-spiritual and corporeal/bodily forces and powers and strength(s) mediated, arbitrated or by means of the latter (corporeal/bodily forces)."

In Chapter IV, 2(A)(b), P.K., as always gives us another theoretical tour de force / recital in highlighting the fusing of will(ing)-wanting-volition and thinking-thought, and how that pertains to a whole range of matters in the history of ideas, commencing (in this sub-sub chapter) with a revival of a modern kind of metaphysics against behaviourism and neo-positivism (or neo-Kantianism against 19th century materialism). We learn that Anglo-Saxons and others inspired by the grossly JOO-ZIO-over-rated JOO-ttgenstein basically “re-invented the wheel” in typical ANGLO-JOO smart-arse fashion positing some kind of hermeneutic line of thought against physicalism and positivism. A distinction between meaning (serving an intention) and physical motion was rightly made (also: the super Great TEUTON-HUN-GOTH-KRAUT Weber referred to the Great JOO Simmel in regard to this). There followed a rather clumsy attempt to detach causality from intentionality, and as all common sense folks know, that is simply not possible in terms of absolute-permanent detachment. From Hume, we arrive at the hermeneutic approaches of “intentionalists” versus “causalists”, who like Hume, drew a sharp distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities or human sciences [[NOTE: There is no fundamental epistemological distinction between the natural sciences and the human/social sciences. Strict non-normative value-free observation of all relevant facts, in terms of absolute logical consistency, and valid and or plausible abstractions for the purposes of comparison in exploring (possible) explanations, laws, constants, regularities, causality etc. is the overall way of proceeding for both the natural, and the natural-human-social, world. P.K.’s oeuvre proves that]]. In any event, the “causalists” loosened and slackened, therefore, the concept of causality, in order to be able transfer it to the theory of acting, action and of the act, whereas the “intentionalists” stuck and clung to their own Humesean version, in order to make such a transfer(ence) as difficult as possible. P.K. precedes to refer to a number of thinkers of both these camps. Suffice it to say that the “intentionalists” saw “determinism” and a lack of “freedom” behind the “causalists’” basic positions, and these ZIO-JOO-ANGLO-GERMANO-JOO SATANISTS ended up in the stupid Covering Law Model [[Social ontology does not share the POP! POP! POP GOES THE WEASEL! Covering Law model’s ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-JOO-ET AL. zeal to “guide, direct and bring about in law-like fashion” events and (the actions, behaviour of) (groups of) humans. Regularities (co-existing with exceptions), and in relation to human intentionality and action as regards the mechanism and spectrum of the social relation, and as regards the political, in the human world, do not constitute laws (even though the mechanism and the spectrum of the social relation, the political per se can be viewed as laws or constants). + Hempel was married to a JOO-essa; Berlin (who made a few pertinent points of criticism regarding his fellow-SATANIST-MAMMONIST “Open Society” POP! POP! POP! POPPER) was a JOO, and Hayek was a very good friend of JOOZ and ANGLO-JOOZ !!! What a fucking JOO-ANGLO-GERMANO-ZIO-JOO GANG-BANG AAAAA-HAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! AND DEFINITELY PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAW AND CAUSALITY (GESETZ UND KAUSALITÄT) ON PAGES 166-167 OF THE GERMAN EDITION (= PAGE 225 OF THE GREEK EDITION) OF THE POLITICAL AND MAN]]. Of great importance here, is that a causal explanation in principle applies to the concrete case, and the causality of a case does not have to be in any necessary relation with a law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) which determines a whole or a complete and entire row, series or range of cases. That is why causal explanations are also possible without the invocation of general laws. Ryle, with his “dispositions” also ended up in a stupid Covering Law position, which does not exist empirically / scientifically seen (but what else would you expect from a semi-retarded ANGLO-ZIO-JOOZ?)

Causality must exist in the sense that human action does not arise out of nothing. There are always motives, reasons, ground for acting present. (Recall that, stricto sensu, human behaviour is unreflected motion etc.). However, there is no general law or guarantee that the causality as up to long causal chains can be accurately ascertained at all times and in all circumstances. Action and inter-action betwixt humans / human groups takes place regardless of whether “ghost in the machine” or “moving the material primum movens constantly backwards” rationalisations predominate. The two fundamental types of causality for most or all humans as regards human acting are the individual’s reasons/grounds or material factors beyond an individual’s mental-rational control (irrespective of whether God etc. is thrown into the mix).   

Reference is then made to the criminal law distinction between actus reus and mens rea. Society’s, which invariable make some kind of distinction between good/ethical and bad/unethical action view causality as related to every individual’s intent(ion)s and free will, even if this is not a philosophically-scientifically valid view of free will. Man, is ultimately a combination of biological drives, urges, impulses and culturally-socially-politically (in the broad sense) determined values, thought and behaviour/action. He is never absolutely free in a strictly scientific-philosophical sense; even when he chooses between alternatives, he is constrained by those alternatives and by the lack of other alternatives etc.. Nor, however and of course, does man lack all will. It follows that “body” and “spirit/intellect” might be conceptually distinct, but ontically go together and cannot be completely, fully and absolutely separate. Man is always restricted by his mobility-related capacity. Next, it is pointed out, that people often act against their own will, and voluntarily submit to “higher” authority / powers. Wanting (willing or the will, volition), and, wishing or liking, are two (different) kinds of things, if we consider and ponder that wanting (and intent(ion)) belong unconditionally, i.e. essentially and necessarily, to the chain of acting, action and the act – not, however, wishing or liking. The sort of funny, sort of quarter- supa JOO, FROOD, is mentioned in regard to primary and secondary processes, and, of course, DA JOO, over-rates the importance of the primary processes of drives, urges and impulses. A duality between reasons/grounds and urges/affects is also wrong and highly misleading. Rational reasons, grounds are not somehow separate from or in command of drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions or sentiments) (or vice versa). Both (rationality and drives/affects) are always at (inter-)play with each other, obviously in different ways and to different degrees depending on the situation.   The motive (as consideration or motivating factor) of an acting, action or act can, consequently, be both something which effectively resists a primary drive, urge, impulse, or, affect (emotion or sentiment), as well as something which rationalises such drives, urges or impulses, or, affects (emotions or sentiments), in a more or less refined manner. Rationality is always in some kind of relationship with drives/emotions, and together constitute the psychical-spiritual and intellectual capacities of humans and their motives. There are no fixed hierarchies of motives (or associated causes) in terms of content applicable to all humans and all human situations, always, except in the minds of ethicists / idealogues and other assorted ZIO-JOO or otherwise psycho-paths and sick animals who think that they can “order and rule da world”.

It follows that anything and everything human can become a motive of action, and temporarily occupy the uppermost or supreme place in the in principle and fundamentally changeable, variable and mutable hierarchy of motives. Also, there is no law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) here, only causality and greater or lesser probability or likelihood.

this is classic P.K. stuff ...

“A motive can, therefore, be determined by several possible causes, which we conventionally call affect (emotion or sentiment), feeling (sense), disposition, calculus or calculation, etc., however, no man is in a position – on the basis of a hierarchy existing in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessities) in respect of these causes – of predicting and forecasting with certainty how and when every one of these causes will take and have an effect.

Just as little as in history or sociology, general rules cannot also here be set up, established or laid down as leitmotifs, guidelines of (or main threads running through) research, which could at least in part replace the analysis of the concrete case. At most, conceivable and thinkable is an approximately complete inventory of factors or forces having an effect, which in the analysis of the concrete case, serves and is of use for the orientation or the formulation of questions.

And just as in history and sociology, also here, a one-dimensional, firmly or fixedly hierarchised effect and impact of causes is thwarted, frustrated, foiled or prevented not least of all by the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) and imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) of the social relation, which puts and places the actor under pressure to modify and adapt his motives, and to draw the same motives, at times, from this, at other times, from that psychical-intellectual(-spiritual) stratum or layer. No disposition can withstand, resist or defy this pressure over the short term or over the long term, as stable as it may be.

Rationality and reflectivity are present even in fits of rage, wrath, passion etc., since concrete aims and the seeking of suitable means are present (e.g. grabbing a knife (and not a feather) to kill someone in a “fit of passion”). People can have motives to act, but not act. It depends on whether action occurs or not !!!

Reference is made to the great Max Weber’s “meaning (sense) context (interrelation) (Sinnzusammenhang)” and the range of uses of motives internally and externally. Key here is the decisive function of the social relation in the rationalisation of motives, that is, for the refinement, diversion, detour(ing) or overcoming of affects (emotions or sentiments) and drives, urges and impulses in motive formation (or in the formation, creation, forming or setting up of motives). An essential shortcoming of the philosophical debates of recent decades was the truly starry-eyed, dewy-eyed, i.e. naive passing by, in a social-ontological aspect, of the theory of acting, action and the act, with the consequence that the dynamics and multi-dimensionality of motives vanished or disappeared behind the more or less monotonous static(s) which the fixation on the individual actor and search for guarantees against the breaking-in (i.e. incursion and invasion) of “irrationality” brought on and provoked” [[BECAUSE JOOZ AND THEIR ZIO-JOO-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-JOO FRIENDS WANTED TO CALL EVERYTHING THAT DID NOT SUIT THEIR GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE RULE AND POSSESSION OF WEALTH “IRRATIONAL” !!! HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!]] In practice, motives are connected with goals and ends. A distinction is then made between motives relating to “because of ...” and “in order to ...” as two varying and different phases of motive formation, with reference to the not insignificant JOO (if I’m not mistaken) Schütz, and Sorokin, Tucker. As always, with regard to interaction, the social-ontological priority of outer and external – i.e. of hard – action is key. “Motives and ends/goals remain in themselves (with)in the area or realm of inner and internal action. The transition to outer and external action requires and needs the intent(ion) of translating and converting – either way, i.e. in any way – motivated ends and goals into praxis (practice). That is why an intent(ion) is an independent and self-sufficient category pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act, which precisely must be distinguished from motives and ends, goals, like the latter (ends, goals) from drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments), and or wishes, in general.” Wishes and intentions do not necessarily coincide. It depends (on the situation), of course. Thinking and knowing (thought and knowledge), the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and the judgement of the situation or position, belong to the formation of motives and ends/goals”. Intent/ion unites and joins a cognitive and volitive component. The two cannot be separated in the real world of action, but only as intellectual/thought abstractions. “There is – anthropologically – no stratum or layer, as deep as one may put it into position or fix it – in which the cognitive [[element, sphere or dimension]] and the volitive [[element, sphere or dimension]] would not be fused and merged with each other. Age-old metaphysical and ethical considerations, which frequently were underpinned and supported in terms of the theory of knowledge, have drawn an arbitrary dividing line or line of separation between thinking / thought, and, wanting-willing / the will or volition, which, though, upon every and any (much) closer and more detailed inspection, must necessarily become all the more blurred, fuzzy, unsharp, out of focus, hazy, fuzzy and vague.” [[THEY DO THIS, BECAUSE SOME RETARDED JOO OR NON-JOO, E.G. PLATO, WHO IS ALSO SEMI-SUPA GREAT, WANTS TO “ETHICALLY FIX” HUMAN ACTION, SO THAT E.G. SOME DICTATOR / TYRANNT OR SOME GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ZIO-JOO ANGLO-FRANCO-GERMANO-ET AL.-JOO PLUTOCRACY / PRIMITIVE SECRET SATAN-MAMMON SOCIETY CAN “RULE DA WOLRD 4-EVER” !!! AS FUCKING IF !!!]] And this SUPA-DUPA sub-sub-chapter concludes with P.K., DA GREATEST OV ALL TIME (HEAVYWEIGHT DIVISION), putting himself alongside our ancestor, ARISTOTLE, DA GREATEST OV ALL DA TIME (POUND FOR POUND), if one wants to look at things in that way.

Chapter IV, Sec. 2A(c) is so “jam-packed” with weighty Kondylisian statements of a social-ontological / anthropological nature, that we shall only briefly mention here that reference is made to: action, meaning, end/goal, means, acting / the act, partial aims, the co-ordination of several acts, contexts pertaining to meaning (sense/meaning contexts and interrelations), interest-determined as well as affectual, emotional and value-like or value-related action, “The connection of meaning/sense and end/goal, as well as the elementary division of meaning (sense) according to its extent, scope or range and degree of clarity constitutes, since Max Weber, a sociological commonplace, however, a social-ontological way of looking at things must, over and above that, explain the conditions under which the question and problem of sense/meaning becomes central for every social life”, man is a sense/meaning-producing being/creature, the connection between meaning and action is social-ontologically fundamental, meaning and action are both fundamental anthropological categories, “Through the wide-ranging and far-reaching, broad, extensive translation or conversion of human bio-psychical basic or fundamental given facts into the language of meaning/sense, the transition from nature to culture is carried out and executed, and society reaches (attains, gains, achieves) only then (or for the first time) the level at which its life can be acted out and take place as human society. Above all, the elementary drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation is transformed and converted into belief (or faith) in meaning/sense and the ideational value of life, so that everyone and anyone who wants to preserve himself as a social being/creature, must share, or at least behave as if he would share, this belief”, ethics, religion, philosophy, law etc., “Sense/meaning-producing and sense/meaning-like living beings (creatures) are ready, prepared and willing to reconcile themselves over the long term with power and dominance as dominant authority over/above them only under the condition that these (power and dominance as dominant authority) are legitimised. Accordingly, they (i.e. sense/meaning-producing and sense/meaning-like living beings) found their own endeavours, efforts and exertions at exercising power and dominance as dominant authority over other (people) with ideological or institutional, but also physical means, by invoking the ultimate, highest etc. meaning/sense of human living together (co-existence or co-habitation). And since, as we have said, action in all its forms, anyhow, presupposes the possession of a certain quantum of power (power quantum), since action means just as much as the power to do something, thus, the sense/meaning of action as action, irrespective of the special sense/meaning of individual acting, action or of the individual act, lies or is found therein, in confirming that the actor lives in terms of meaning/sense, i.e. he exists socially.”, ...


Chapter IV, Section 1, 2B goes by the title/heading “Situation and Time” and explains how all human (internal and external) action is situation-related and situation-limited, although the situation itself relates to broader-than-the-situation-itself surroundings, which, in turn, limit the situation, and the subjects and objects of the situation relate to either internal and or external action, etc.. From the perspective of social-ontological analysis, both subjects and objects of a situation are objects. In any given situation, there is never either absolute and total freedom, or absolute and total constraint. In the (sociologically meant) situation, actuality and potentiality are interwoven with each other, one checks or curbs the other, and the other pierces or undermines the first one. The same motives do not apply equally to all actors or even the same actor, from situation to situation, so there can be no one kind of rationalistic law-like behaviourism applicable to all, in all situations, nothwithstanding what retarded ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL.-JOOZ or other retarded universalists would like to think. From the point of view of the reality of the situation, it is immaterial how actors subjectively perceive the situation, even though those actors will invariably or usually have to become (somewhat) realistic if they want to attain certain goals. P.K. then goes into the close relationship between situation, social relation, actors and ends/goals, and how the struggle over the binding definition of the situation reflects the struggles for power and control of the actors (and their respective identities) involved. Next, there is some discussion of the (moving, changing) boundaries of the situation in relation to actors and surroundings, how situations and their actors and their surroundings are invariably neither fully open or fully closed, and relate to both the social-ontological-anthropological, and, the sociological-historical of the situation as a spatio-temporal continuum. There is no “typical” situation of crisis and decision as the existentialists would have us believe. What is accurate is that the situation is a field of acting and of the act (or an action field), and the decision, concretised as an intent(ion), represents and constitutes the specific feature (or characteristic) (differentia specifica) of action vis-à-vis mere behaviour, which may or may not have something to do with “crisis or typical” situations. Time presses actors in the situation (whether a “crisis / exceptional” situation, whether a “normal” situation), whereas time is at a standstill in the surroundings. Man must act in a situation (= a law). Preventive action is the ultimate form of time pressure and the need to act. The past is more prominent in the present (in an actor’s imagination, thinking, etc.) when less or nothing is expected of the future, but when people look to the future intensely, the past “weighs them down” less. Anthropologically, however, the future always has primacy, since man acts into the future. To act with regard to the past (e.g. in the case of a traditionalistic actor), does not mean to act in the past. Universal(istic) principles and ideas cannot but be borne and promoted by concrete actors in concrete situations with concrete particularist(ic) power claims and claims to validity (in the name of “universal principles”).

Chapter IV, Section 2C opens with a reminder that social-ontologically, two actors in a social relation is the bear minimum. Discussion of dyads and triads covers all fundamentals of the social-ontological understanding of the social relation, whether in regard to individuals or groups / collectivities. In regard to specific, concrete situations, sociological and historical analysis necessarily play their roles in the scientific understanding of social / human reality. Macro-structures do not represent and constitute the mere sum of micro-structures, and the relation between two individuals becomes or turns into a social relation only against the background of an already existing society. The SUPA-DUPA ALL-TIME GREAT JOO, Simmel, features in this sub-section, incl. his faults. Two actors in interaction, in principle, suffice so that we can imagine everything that lies between the pole of extreme friendship and that pole of extreme enmity. The essence or nature of association and dissociation, of co-operation and estrangement (or alienation) comes to light in dyadic constellations, as it were, in chemical purity, whereas triadic interactions, rather, are suitable for the study of chemical combinations. P.K., (also) in the case of the necessary third party as regards the full gamut of social-political relations, shows that in regards to social-scientific understanding, it is not per se a matter of psychical dispositions, but rather of the interactions between actors and the relative power (and identities) of the parties. What follows is like a guiding blue-print for geo-political analyses, and other analyses of power/identity relations. DON’T MISS IT, PEOPLE !!! The third party’s presence is, inter alia, crucial for objective observation and the refinement of the division of labour, as well as for the existence of the social/human relation. Hence, Sartre was not a total nut-job, something we find out again in this sub-section !!! There is reference to Rousseau’s classic and fundamental error regarding “peaceable” solitary man in a “state of nature”, but also to the error of the (i.e. Hobbes’s) war of all against all by way of using the triad as an illustration of such an impossibility (given that human society does not cease to exist). Whilst within the dyad it is possible for the intellectual-spiritual to dominate the physical, such a fundamental feature of human culture comes to full light only in the triad, in relation to which discussion of coalition formation ensues with the inevitable references to the paramount importance of power and identity, and the under-estimation by silly, stupid, ideological “game theorists” of subjective perception in regard to “rational actors” and power relations. The great SOOPA-DOOPA JOO, Simmel, again features (with his omissions, lapses and shortcomings) re: triads and coalition formation and power/identity relations, with a particular emphasis on the (phenomenology of the) third party. REPEAT: HERE WE HAVE A CLASSIC ALL-TIME GREAT EXPOSITION OF BASIC POWER RELATIONS, WHICH CONSTITUTES A BLUE-PRINT FOR THE EXAMINATION OF POWER RELATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ALL THE WAY TO FAR SMALLER CONSTELLATIONS OF POWER RELATIONS (INCLUDING TENDENCIES TOWARDS MONOPOLIES AND OLIGOPOLIES), WHICH MEANS, INTER ALIA, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A “NEUTRAL, FAIR RULES-BASED ORDER” UNCONNECTED TO POWER/IDENTITY-RELATED INTERESTS ... DON’T MISS IT !!!

Chapter IV, D(a) concerns mutuality-reciprocity, exchange and its various social manifestations, including the necessity of the outer/external social relation and outer/external social action, across the entire spectrum of the social relation. We start with the Golden Rule, in existence since ancient times, with a very telling reference to Polybius, as well as to the Bible, the Mahabharata etc.. It is emphasised that the social relation (with its spectrum and mechanism) is the comprehensive social phenomenon, and NOT mutuality-reciprocity and exchange. There is a classic P.K. reference to ethicising-normative ideologisation and nomen est omen (with DA SOOPA JOO DURKHEIM getting involved), whilst it is also highlighted that mutuality-reciprocity and exchange cannot constitute the foundation of society, no matter what retarded game theorists might think, and no matter how common the Golden Rule is throughout the ages, the reality of social praxis and hierachies etc. means that it only exists ideologically and nowhere near universally in practice. Why is it, however, that mutuality/reciprocity are thought of ideologically as universally realisable (even though they are not in practice), and not the command to love, which remains a high, but distant ideal? The answer lies in the fact that the command to love reaches the point of self-sacrifice, whereas mutuality and reciprocity remain ambivalent and more (by no means totally) in sync with the ambivalences of real-world action (without the emotion-feelings-laden character of love), whilst also explaining ideologically that no-one can “have and win everything”, since others “want everything” too, incl. in terms of notions of “justice” and the sense of “everyone contributing” in times of crises and war (whether or not it is really the case). Mutuality/reciprocity as ideology (and practice) contributes to a sense of calculability/ponderability, i.e. safety, trust and control (cf. Hume). The discussion now moves onto trust, mistrust and altruism, and the extent altruism can reach – e.g. as denial of one’s own self, and e.g. the suspicions that can arise in the recipient of supposed altruism, etc.. It is emphasised that society pre-exists man, i.e. every human individual is related or has reference to a society, and mutuality/reciprocity is not necessary or ubiquitous in regard to all human and social relations. The optimum power for an individual would be to enjoy the full benefit of society, whilst not being bound by mutuality/reciprocation. Whilst e.g. the group of anti-Christ Satanist JOOZ, grossly disproportionately enjoys wealth and power in the former West by various legal and illegal “behind the scenes” means, such power can never be total, nor is it ever “enough”. The concept of “love” and its reciprocation relates to the logic of the gift, which will be examined in a later sub-section, but mutuality / reciprocity, given that it extends across the entire spectrum of the social relation, has far greater practical application than the command of love, e.g. as in the case of the punishment of illegal and or unethical acts. A discussion of punishment ensues, touching upon its various manifestations, incl. the collective determining punishment (rather than the individual done harm), and revenge. We then move on to confining mutuality/reciprocity to what it actually is, and not as an ideological constitutive principle of society (e.g. in functionalism), with particular emphasis given to the phenomenon of complementarity (which allows for asymmetrical-unequal relations, but not necessarily mutual/reciprocal equality), including the convertibility of qualities and the extraction of surplus or added value by one side. Mention is made of three cases regarding power potential: that of the overwhelmingly powerful side getting whatever it wants; that of the equality of the sides; and that of inequality existing in favour of one side because of greater power potential, without that side “getting everything”. Social theorists as ideologues have tended to focus on the first two cases to set up their “ideologisations” about what is rational / reasonable from the point of view of the strong (who has the relative power to compel, coerce and force opposing sides)!!! AAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA !!!!!!!!!!!! Of course, in situations which the dominant side does not “take everything”, and there is no strict symmetry, complementarity in mutuality / reciprocity means that there is some (up to greatly and grossly disproportionately, or even mutually accepted “protective” and) uneven “give and take”. The sub-section ends with a compelling discussion, inter alia, of Aritstotle’s: justitia correctiva, justitia commutativa, justitia distributiva and “moralistic aggression” / fiction / hypocrisy / deceit AAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In relation to Chapter IV, Section 2, sub-sub-section D(b), some comments can be found in ῬΗΠΗΤ.1.000.075 ΠΡΟΣΘΗΚΗ 14 ¡NO PASARÁN! (https://furthermaterial.yolasite.com/). Suffice it to say that the social relation is wider than mutuality / reciprocity [[BECAUSE ONTOLOGICALLY E.G. INDIVIDUALS A AND B EXIST IN RELATION TO SOCIETY, THE SOCIAL RELATION CAN E.G. BE BETWEEN A (AND OR SOCIETY) AGAINST B, I.E. GOING FURTHER THAN BEING MUTUAL/RECIPROCAL BETWEEN A AND B AS DOMINANCE ON THE PART OF A (AND OR SOCIETY) AGAINST B, OR, BETWEEN SOCIETY AND A / B, WHEREBY A / B HAVE NO SAY, I.E. NO MUTUALITY-RECIPROCITY WHEN DOMINATED BY SOCIETY (E.G. WHEN SOCIETY (THROUGH THE POLITICAL) DOES NOT ALLOW A AND B TO SPEAK PUBLICALLY, OR, SIMPLY EXECUTES THEM ETC.).]], which in turn, is wider than exchange. The widening of exchange as a concept beyond its empirical reality is a manifestation of ideological fanaticism on the part of its proponents, who are, GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY, ZIO-ANTI-CHRIST JOOZ and ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL.-JOOZ, GREAT FUCKING SATAN, for obvious reasons related to ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL.-JOO capitalism / imperialism / hegemony / systematic and organised criminality-kleptocracy-gangsterism-high-pressure crook mafia-like conspiracies and dominance posing as “democracy, pluralism, tolerance, diversity, human rights, liberalism, freedom, free-market economics, rule of law, rules-based order” and other such ridiculous, ideological-theological speaking-in-tongues and frothing-at-the-mouth absurdities and inanities, whose conveyors and supporters passionately believe in, and with no less fervour and zeal than devout Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Communists or believers of “primitive” shamanic / animist and other religions. 

Included is, inter alia, reference to “rational choice theory”, (classical) utilitarianism, A. Smith, Bentham and Mill; the c. 1900 critique of the law of money in capitalism in the context of SOOPA-JOO Simmel’s functionalism, and later the far less sociological-scientific, and far more Satanistic and not-so-SOOPA-JOO von Mises, who set the tone for the latter highly ideological, stupid and downright silly “social exchange theories” (contra the more realistic, but still normativistic, Parsons) and the variations of “free-market” ideology, including the Highly-Retarded and Highly ULTRA-SATANIC ZIO-JOO Blau. Suffice it to say, all the ZIO-SATANIC-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL.-JOOZ ideologise in terms of the “free market” because it suits them perfectly to do so, since they control all the relevant political economies of the former West GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY IN ORGIES OF ZIO-JOO SATANIC AND GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE POWER-PRIVILEGE-SUPREMACY-RACISM-BIGOTRY-CHAUVANISIM AND HATE, GREAT FUCKING SATAN !!! We turn our attention now to the ARCH-ZIO-JOO RETARD, Blau, and his ZIO-idiotic mixing and confusing of social and economic exchange. Next is the equally ridiculous ANGLO-JOO, Homans (and his ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOO followers), and his retarded behaviouristic-economistic and “perfect competition /free market” ideology, assuming equal power potential for all actors and long-term stability in their relations without the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation existing ! Next, there is a fascinating analysis of the diachrony of “silent trade” pointing to the possible extreme asymmetry between economic exchange and the social relation, leading up to a discussion of how the social relation trumps (is up to much broader) than economic exchange when it comes to the real world of power politics, and also, inter alia, in relation to time. P.K. highlights the folly and idiocy of economistic (and) methodological individualism (including totally retarded “game theory”), purporting, absolutely ideologically and absolutely incorrectly, to isolate economic exchange from the social in toto. At the end of the day, there can be no on-going economic relations without other power relationships providing the overall context and backdrop of such economic relations. More stupid ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOO theoretical-ideological rubbish is exposed for what it is, a pathetic attempt to conceal the historical and present power and dominance grossly disproportionately in the hand of criminal ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOOZ through their historically and stilly currently criminal up-root / de-root capitalistic imperialism, though, for obvious reasons, the discussion is about “slavery” only, though P.K. does refer to the “old liberal belief” / ideological clap-trap about trade replacing war, etc.. Exchange is a social relation. But not all social relations are exchange. Only

in a society which – at least for the time being – is or seems to be “post-industrial” and has “solved”

the problem of access to production, do ridiculous ideological theories of exchange ("free market /

perfect competition" etc.) and communication etc. come to the fore. Reality, however, knows and

does otherwise !!!

For commentary on the highly and extremely compelling : Chapter IV, 2D(c) see “ῬΗΠΗΤ.1.000.075 ΠΡΟΣΘΗΚΗ 16ΣΤ ¡NO PASARÁN!” or “ΠΟΤ-ΠΟΥΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΤΙ-ΦΡΟΥΤΤΙ ΦΥΡΔΗΝ ΜΙΓΔΗΝ ΑΡΕΣ ΜΑΡΕΣ ΚΟΥΚΟΥΝΑΡΕΣ 1” etc. at https://furthermaterial.yolasite.com/ ... (suffice it to say da JOOZ (as APES IN HUMANZ) turn out to be even more Evil and Satanic than Evil and Satan Himself, since they engage in mass Incest and tell others they are “racist” !!!, even whilst these others are being (in)directly ethnically cleansed and genocided by incestual (and non-incestual) hyper-racist JOOZ demselvez !!! through da FORCE OV TOTAL EVIL / TOTAL EVIL FORCE ZIO-USA, FULL-SPEKTROOM ZIO-LOBOTIMIZATION AND ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL.-JOOZ, ALL REKROOTED TO DA INCEST-HYPER-RACIST-“CHOZEN, EXSPESIONAL, GOT DA BAKON ON DA HILL AND A REICH OV 999,999,999 YEARZ “MASTER RACE””-BASED ZIO-JOO SATAN-LUCIFER-ANTI-CHRIST TRIBE DURING DA CORSE OV ABOUT TWO CENTURIEZ FROM CIRCA 1750-1800 TO CIRCA 1900-WW2, I.E. TO DA CORZ OV INCEST-BASED-HYPER-ZIO-JOO-RACIST-ZIO-JOO LED SATANIZIM, ANTI-CHRISTIANITY, LUCIFERIZIM AND ESP. AFTER WW2, DA RACIAL AND CULTURAL EXTINCTION OV DA HISTORICAL RELATIVELY WHITE AND CHRISTIAN PEOPLEZ OV DA FORMA WEST ... but before we get to all of that, another over-rated semi-retarded JOO, Lévi-Strauss, is pulled apart re: exchange and structure by SOOPA-DOOPA-Hellenic-APE P.K. (incl. a reference to Lewis White, American cultural anthropology and the erroneous biologistic explanation of the incest taboo, as well as to the erroneous exogenous explanation of the incest taboo proffered by White, and Malinowski’s turning of a correct endogenous explanation of the incest taboo into an erroneous “back-door” exogenous explanation) ... ) ...

We complete Chapter 4 (“the nightmare to translate chapter”) with Section 2D(d) on the gift and how, in essence, from “primitive” times, well before money-based societies, the giving of the gift was a way of “getting involved” in the affairs of others, including up to dominating them and exhibiting one’s own superiority (as “showing off”). Reference is made, inter alia, to cannibalism in this chapter (and that is not unrelated to incestual and non-incestual, rat-tunnel and non-rat-tunnel, criminally organised, primitive secret society, savage tribe anti-Christ, Great Satanist & Lucifer ZIO-JOOs). Reference is also made to the semi-retarded ZIO-JOO utopist and insane-like ideologue, Mauss, who identified the gift with a “totality” and not with its real-world, in-part and situation-related and concrete characteristics, and also mystified the social relation as regards the gift and sorcery, wizardry, witchcraft and magic in a totally typically ZIO-retarded attempt to erase the inimical half of the social relation, i.e. to erase conflict (preceding, inter alia, his fellow ZIO-JOO-semi-retard, Lévi-Strauss, though following the SOOPA-DOOPA but up to very flawed and somewhat at least retarded ZIO-JOOs: Marx, Durkheim and Simmel, for instance). In other words, the semi-retarded ZIO-JOO Mauss wants Rousseau to be the describer of reality, but reality is actually described by Hobbes [except for the “state of nature” silliness]. Various situations involving gifts and friendship and enmity are then also referred to, including, inter alia, cases in which the gift becomes a means for enmity and or humiliation in regard to the recipient of the gift, as well as forms of bribery and gifts in other situations involving power (in)equality etc., touching upon social phenomena such as social stratification, (in)dependence, co-operation/alliances, altruism and enmity, conflict / war (in regard, inter alia, to Malinowski’s stupid peace-leaning-exchange-centred interpretation of the Kula ring, notwithstanding that he knew the social sphere (as a whole, inclusive of the political) has priority over the economic sphere). Potlatch and Uvalaku are also referred to, as well as the Kula in relation to cannibalism and not eating one’s (new) partners. It is reiterated again that there is no exchange as mutuality and reciprocity which is constitutive of society, but is only part of society, as there are always goods, incl. crystallisations of power and identity which are not exchangeable within a particular society (= unless things in that society lead to a “new order of society”, i.e. a new society).   

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