Disclaimer: Nothing within this page or on this site overall is the product of Panagiotis Kondylis's thought and work unless it is a faithful translation of something Kondylis wrote. Any conclusions drawn from something not written by Panagiotis Kondylis (in the form of an accurate translation) cannot constitute the basis for any valid judgement or appreciation of Kondylis and his work. (This disclaimer also applies, mutatis mutandis, to any other authors and thinkers linked or otherwise referred to, on and within all of this website).








Title Pages and Table of Contents

Chapter IV

The Political and Man, Chapter IV, Section 1A: The inner mechanism of the social relation relates to mental acts (isolated in terms of theory and as a simplifying abstraction) necessary for a social relation to take place against the background of a pre-existing society (its processes of socialisation etc.), and involves understanding the Other has subjectivity, as well as putting oneself in the Other’s situation or position. Because of our social-ontological orientation, psychologism – as in the case of the spectrum of the social relation – is avoided at all costs, and we find that the inner mechanism of the social relation operates across the whole of the friend-foe spectrum and the said spectrum’s continuum, regardless of “positive or negative” characteristics of individuals. We are concerned with the mechanism as a form of the social relation applying to all individuals in all situations, and always interrelating with the spectrum of the social relation, and not with the psychological content in every particular instance, which might actually be of interest to (social) psychologists, historians and sociologists. The outer/external mechanism, involving external acts (including the internal acts) will be examined in detail in the second half of this chapter.   

Chapter IV, Section 1Ba delves into the fundamental characteristics of the Ego/I, the Other (and the Other’s imponderability), and subjectivity. The importance of society pre-existing individuals is highlighted in order to reiterate the theoretical context for social-ontological investigation. Equally important is the sharp demarcation between humans and non-human animals, of which all humans qua humans (generally) have a firm sense. There’s a very telling Freeman-Slave reference to Plato, followed by a “to be or not to be” explanation tying in with a fundamental characteristic of human subjectivity. It follows, that all humans have a sense of I (Ego) and Other (Alter) and subjectivity involved on both sides. Imponderability and incalculability, as well as changeability, all loom large in human social relations, and make the mechanism of the social relation constantly interact and intersect with the spectrum of the social relation and its Friend-Foe continuum. Related to the above is also a lack of (absolute) control – one cannot necessarily always control either the thoughts or the actions of the Other and or Others as much and as deeply as one might want to, even if one explains such lack of control (in concealing one’s own power claims and or actual power) as being the result of “irrationalism” or “blind drives/passions” etc.. The relative lack of (mobile) resistance of an inanimate object is contrasted to the always present potential of a human subject to either kill another human and or kill himself. Death, therefore, is key. Any subjectivity can potentially occupy any place along the continuum of the spectrum of the (Friend-Foe) social relation, and because there can never be a state of continual “total” control, there is never ANY possibility of “eternal peace” or “perfect harmony”. Interpretation cannot provide any definite and absolute certainty regarding the Other. The Other always retains its potential (at least) imponderability, incalculability and unpredictability. Of course, societies always provide – to varying degrees and in many various ways – institutions and or conventions which lessen the general aspect of imponderability and uncontrollability, yet such institutions and conventions can never efface conflict and or (potential) violence from society forever. The commonly held views, maxims, proverbs etc. of ordinary (primitive, etc./et al.) peoples across all cultures and known eras attest to the lack of total, permanent foreseeability and controllability of the Other. Ritual and magic in “primitive” tribes relate to the notion of bringing or trying to bring the uncontrollable under control. With a reference to Ortega y Gasset, mention is made of “the complete Other” who is not yet Friend or Foe, but does (or can) represent potential danger. Individuals constantly display a sense that the Other has similar formal capacities as to the mechanism of the social relation, but is always more than capable of acting unpredictably and or contrarily to the Ego’s own wishes etc.. Distance and proximity in the social relation relate to the taking on and assumption of roles, which will be investigated later in this chapter. General knowledge about all humans taking on roles and having subjectivity etc., guarantees no necessary knowledge about what another subjectivity will do in a concrete situation. Cf. La Rochefoucauld. Of course, a great deal of human behaviour and action is ponderable and foreseeable, because just as humans cannot live in a state of only conflict, so too, they cannot know absolutely nothing about what all other people will do next, etc.. Just as all normality has exceptions, so too, all societal contexts will include imponderability (Max Weber re: sociologically amorphous power and institutionally founded authority as dominance). Both ponderability and imponderability interrelate with BOTH friendship and enmity, though friendship must be wanted by both sides, which is not the case re: enmity. Joruba-tribe: peace is the father of friendship, as peace can exist not just between friends, but also between foes etc.. Discussion then follows regarding system and environment, ponderability-normality, Schütz, Parsons, ethnomethodology etc.. In particular, in regard to Schütz (and his with-world and environment distinction, etc.), there seems to be a theoretical tendency towards atomisation and general harmlessness without conflict etc. (= ideologically ideal for “multiculturalism” and the “concealment” of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystallisations of power. P.K., of course, does NOT expressly state this, but unless I’m imagining things, this seems to be the general tone of the argumentation). In any event, P.K. goes on to point out that compulsion and conflict never go permanently away, and the positing of “ideal circumstances” has nothing to do with reality. Subjectivity and a capacity to act not as expected are always present, as is the Other’s capability at rejecting and resisting. Parsons and G. H. Mead fell into similar theoretical traps as Schütz. Norms, rules, laws etc. in societies, can never remove the imponderability and incalculability always potentially present in subjectivity and its action. P.K. refers to the keeping to forms and the keeping up of appearances etc. as long as NOTHING VITAL as to identity (and power) is at stake. Norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground, as well as a battlefield. Even common meaning contexts (which are subject to varying interpretations, anyway) e.g. re: culture and language, guarantee no constant ponderability. Robbers and blackmailers will do their crimes, but they still have recourse to social norms, as in e.g. a mutually understood language. Common Sense is closer to the very varied and rich-in-situations reality than many a phenomenologist of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologist (P.K. does not say it, but I say it: in the 20th century = GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY = Jews in esp. the USA, France and England). Reference is made to the constant anxiety-like potentiality of existence, in which the Ego’s status and identity can always be potentially challenged etc.. The subjectivity of the Other is perceived not merely as acting (i.e. active), but also as perceiving (i.e. perceptive), whereby perception here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other, to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. It’s not, though, enough to refer to the Other’s dispositions to secure a permanent ponderability, which simply cannot be secured in reality (as a matter of social reality). P.K. master class time re: causality:

“Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, the subject’s (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for, and to take into account, the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in which the Other must unfold and develop his activity. In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. ... Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity as subjectivity par excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is, as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).”

Further discussion ensues as regards intentions and subjectivity and the overall objective factual situation, including the I (ego) acting in a friendly manner to someone who might want to do the I (ego) harm, because of specific considerations and interests, of which the I (ego) is cognizant, and not necessarily the Other. Reference to Nietzsche and his oversimplification re: intentions, subjectively meant and objective meaning. + The I (ego) tends to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) by means of intentions, and makes its own act(ion)s, especially act(ion)s unpleasant to the Other, more likely, plausible by means of circumstances. Whatever the case may be, subjectivity (and its always potential imponderability, even though much of it is and can be ponderable) is always prominent in human, social relations.

Section 1B(b) of Chapter IV, starts off by reminding us that just as ponderability and imponderability can relate to both friendship and enmity in accordance with each and every respective situation, so too alienness/unfamiliarity and familiarity have no necessary relationship with either friendship or enmity. Hence, if identity (and its vital interests) are not put at risk, the alien or strange (and uncanny, weird, eerie or mysterious), including any attendant relativisation of one’s own values, not only is not viewed as inimical, it can even be worshipped, depending, again, on the concrete situation. Furthermore, the alien/strange does not at all have to come “from without” but could be someone from a particular group who does not “conform” in some kind of noticeable and or “offensive/abnormal” way. P.K. refers to the fact that extreme conflict such as civil wars and family vendettas have existed when the cultural and or other affinity is relatively close. In other words, strangeness or alienness does not carry with it any inherent “quality” of conflict etc. which does not or cannot exist in circumstances of relative familiarity and or similarity. “Prejudice”, being a kind of typification, i.e. rendering into types, can NEVER be eliminated (simply because humans qua humans always (have the capacity to) think in terms of categories and groups, as well as individuals, and make distinctions,... regardless of how those distinctions are geared by favouring x and prejudicing y,... etc. [[SO, “fighting” one form of “racism and supremacy” simply promotes another form of “racism and supremacy”, including situations when ABSOLUTELY FILTHY AND DISGUSTING ANIMAL-RAT/RODENT-LIKE GROUPS (AS A SUBJECTIVE MATTER OF TASTE) IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES “ENJOY” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE FORMS OF POWER AND WEALTH AT ELITE LEVEL, INCLUDING THROUGH PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING AND HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT IN BANKING, HIGH FINANCE, CORPORATIONS, ETC.]]). Notwithstanding any initial tension (rather than surprise in the case of someone familiar taking up a different position in the spectrum of the social relation), once the alien is active in a social relation with someone, the said alien will take up a position in the spectrum of the social relation just like any familiar person. Everyone, thus, can become “estranged and alienated”, or the other way around, regardless of whether people were initially familiar or alien to others. There is reference to Husserl and “a core of the state of knowing and familiarity” in regard to even the most alien and strange, whereas even the most familiar can or does contain an element of alienness. What is always KEY is THE SOCIAL REALTION AND IDENTITY (POWER), and where people stand within the social relation between one another. So, non-Greeks were NOT barbarians to Greeks in Homer, but were most definitely in the 5th century... Both idealisation and daemonisation (worship of the alien and or stranger, and killing the alien/stranger) are always possible, as is the whole gamut of possible social relations. Very illustrative is Levine’s schematisation: if a friendly relation(ship) towards the alien/foreigner/stranger unfolds or develops, then he becomes in the case of a visit, like a guest; in the case of a temporary stay, like a resident; and in the case of a lasting, i.e. permanent, stay, like a newly accepted member of the community; if, however, the relation(ship) turns into something inimical, then one treats the stranger/alien, in the first case, like an intruder/interloper/penetrator/infiltrator/invader; in the second case, like an internal foe; and in the third case, like a pariah or outcast. The alien can show tremendous zeal to confirm in a new society, or can go the opposite way and display tremendous aggressivity to the host population, by exploiting any freedoms offered to him as a kind of release valve or vent. [[I’ve lived all this through personal experience, but of course, never with physical violence or being needlessly rude to anyone (there's no point and it's against the law...) (AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!):]] The inimical pole of the social relation is, therefore, here occupied when the alien/stranger, in regard to all points, stresses the differences between himself and the new surroundings or environment; the friendly pole of the social relation is occupied when the alien/stranger wants to desperately and absolutely be assimilated, in relation to which he may express the same inability to really understand foreign (alien or strange) mores and ways of thinking, both in regard to exaggerated and overdone censure and reproach, or in regard to exaggerated and overdone praise. In between (the said two exaggerated and overdone extremes), there are stances like for instance outer (external) adaptation during inner (internal) distancing etc.. The discussion now turns to trust and mistrust, and it is explained how whilst trust requires at the very least a certain familiarity, overall, both trust and mistrust can arise in view of both the relatively familiar and the relatively unfamiliar. KEY AGAIN IS ALWAYS THE SOCIAL RELATION AND THE SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN IT. Trust is always particular (i.e. a part or a portion as opposed to the whole), it relates to certain aspects of social life, certain subjects or certain properties and qualities of these subjects, which, by the way, means that trust is regularly accompanied by mistrust against other aspects of social life, against other subjects, or against other properties and qualities of these subjects. Given that societal norms and rules are never totally adhered to by everyone, and in fact can be breached regularly by many people, depending on the situation, trust cannot be a phenomenon characterising the whole of society, but must take place in regard to specific, concrete, in part, particular, individual circumstances and situations. Trust – closely connected to “expectations” (whose content can vary from person to person), aims, intentions,... – is basically nothing other than an ultimate or final irreducible statement about ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability): absolute trust applies to the absolutely ponderable (calculable); imponderability (incalculability) is synonymous and tantamount to untrustworthiness and unreliability. Trust can exist in all kinds of relations including between criminals, and does not have to exist for there to be an expectation. Individual and collective life would not be possible (it would become paralysed) if everyone trusted everyone absolutely. Trust does not and cannot constitute an original magnitude, but presupposes a certain shaping and formation of the social relation, i.e. in concrete cases there can be fixed, on-going trust between people, but not to the extent that the inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation can be eliminated. Whoever gives or bestows trust, confirms the person being given trust’s identity, and the return or reciprocation of trust functions as the recognition for this recognition. Neither does trust connect or link the totality of the societal extent, scope or reference, nor does trust, at a certain moment, connect all members of society with all members of this same society. Social-ontologically, of interest is the ascertainment that existing trust indeed promotes and reinforces friendship and co-operation, but by no means suffices to guarantee friendship and co-operation’s smooth course; in very many cases, in fact, precisely this course constitutes the precondition and prerequisite for the emergence of trust. At the overall societal level, trust develops its effect not in chemical purity, but in its – from case to case – mix and blend of heterogeneous elements in different doses. The discussion proceeds to impersonal “rational mistrust” in particular as regards institutions and very importantly, FEAR. I.e., by keeping people afraid of sanctions, punishments etc., society is aided in terms of social disciplining and reducing imponderabilities by people “rationally mistrusting” such institutions, etc.. In this sense, the Joruba are right: peace, that is, an institutionally fairly well-ordered state of affairs, not, for instance, trust, is the father of friendship. Of course, there are also cases where personal trust bypassing the “rational mistrust” re: fear and institutions etc. plays a role (P.K. refers to Albanians, and not to Satanists, but he could have... AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!). Reality has proved time and time again that Emerson’s “Trust men and they will be true to you”, does not hold for everyone all of the time in the real world of the social relation. Yet, in such moral stances, the ideal self-understanding of society is expressed and carries on living, of which society has unconditional need in order to be able to function as a society. Examples from Democritus, Seneca and Shakespeare show an awareness that trust on its own is hardly sufficient for honesty or sincere relations between all people; that trust is the opposite of fear and vice versa, etc.. There can be no generalised trust. The dangerous and risky imponderability (incalculability) of the Other is the ultimate source of, in practice, offered and shown “rational mistrust”. Chamfort = wisdom goes with fear. Similarly, the Ashanti. In Western mass democracies, “trust”, the concept, at last became a major part of theory, connected to communication, “rationality”, pluralism and the associated [[particularly ZIO-Satanic, I say, not P.K.]] sentimentalisation permeating Western societies. The functionalist Simmel made the error of tying trust into supposedly enhanced/increasing societal objectification and ponderability from a “community” vs. “society” perspective, with modern “society” providing “objectification” tying into enhanced trust and “reliability” making any need for “personal” relationships superfluous (and this, from a JOO!!! Simmel must have been a VERY NON-JOO, JOO!!!). The reality is that notions of the objective and the personal have been around since ancient times (Socrates/Plato) and magicians/“primitive peoples”. Luhmann-like systems theory positions also do not prove that society can reach a level where trust (as opposed to mistrust) can eliminate conflict etc.. It becomes obvious, therefore, that what counts are the social relation and constellations/correlations of power, and not e.g. “thoughtlessness and frivolity” in relation to trust and mistrust. P.K. gives some relevant examples of how power relations affect trust, ending with the example of (nearly) all people locking their front door and taking the key with them when they leave their home.

[[SO, what is paramount from a strictly scientific-descriptive point of view, is that society has a relative balance/equilibrium between the material conditions of living for the masses (access to food, shelter, goods, health, jobs, employment, income etc.) as they relate to the ideological-aesthetical acceptance of power structures and institutions, hierarchies, dominant ideology, etc., rather than the racial and or cultural make up of a society per se. When, however, such a balance or equilibrium becomes relatively unhinged by e.g. masses of anomic-ape behaviour or by a non-acceptance at elite and or lower levels of the hierarchies of distributions of forms of power and wealth etc., then the SHIT CAN POTENTIALLY HIT THE FAN, and that could mean the (increased, enhanced, radicalised, etc.) entry of racial and or cultural matters into the politics within the political and the social. Neither relative “monoculturalism”, nor relative “multiculturalism” is – per se and as such and inherently – a “Strength” or a “Weakness”. It depends. As do aesthetical preferences, depend...]]         

Chapter IV, Section 1Ca amounts to a brief historical-theoretical overview of the adoption of perspectives in social theory. Readers are reminded of the disconnecting of sociology from the philosophy of history in the late 19th and early 20th century, which had as a consequence the downgrading or elimination of broader social/group entities or structures by focusing on interactions and mutual influences between individual actors and their subjective perspectives and meanings. Objective meaning, however, did not disappear with the philosophy of history, as can be seen, inter alia, by the real-world operation of the heterogony of ends. A further focus of attention is on formal sociology, functionalism and the phenomenology of the interpenetrating of perspectives, understanding (the Other), consciousnesses, action plans, putting oneself into the position of the Other, self-interpretation, anticipating the Other, etc.,... of both people/actors in an archetypal-like (social-ontological) social relation. Reference is made to: Tönnies (who only saw the outer – and not inner – aspect of the social relation), v. Wiese, Simmel, Weber, Vierkandt, Gurvitch, Husserl, Schütz (incl. the motive-in-order-to [[think and or do...]] and the because-motive [[as to causality, reasons, justification(s),...]]), and Löwith. [[WTF? 5 out of 9 of these very important to super or even all-time-great thinkers were fucking JOOs!!! Ugh, YUK!!! Stiff Cheddar to ME!!! (AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]

Chapter IV, Section 1Cb constitutes, inter alia, and as it were, the “brainwashing/lobotomisation” description sub-section of The Political and Man. The reading here is VERY HEAVY, SLOW-GOING, and requires A LOT OF TIME AND PATIENCE. However, as always, any reader who gets himself (and far less likely, herself) to the point of understanding “what is going on”, WILL – as always with P.K.’s absolutely UNIQUE in the History of Ideas, Theory and Thought, way of dissecting, analysing and putting THINGS – BE VERY RICHLY REWARDED. Of course, P.K. uses a language as neutral as possible, and leaves it to “interpreters” like myself to draw their own conclusions. Hence, before getting into the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, we are reminded of the assumption of roles and imponderability, unpredictability cum subjectivity, and not being able to know what the Other is thinking with any constant, consistent certainty. The very important juxtaposition is made with regard to non-human animals, in that humans through human language and symbolism and the assumption of roles etc. have developed a capacity for, and (cap)ability at, deceit, deception, delusion and illusion which are unknown in the rest of the animal kingdom, which (comparatively) tends to react more immediately to the immediate stimuli of the immediate environment in generally more rigidly typified manners. Reference is then made to the human ability to plan future action, and the very human need to want to anticipate the future actions of others etc.. Human reflective (thought) activity exists with the Ego’s knowledge that the Other also has such a reflective capacity and ability and, in practice, the fact that the Ego takes into account the Other’s possible action plans, as well as vice versa, constitutes a crucial (hard core) aspect of the mechanism of the social relation. Reflective activity also intersects with interpretation, opening up a whole array of possibilities in thought, anticipation, understanding and actual action, etc., especially given that a number of (groups of) Others may be within the Ego/I’s range of thought and thought cum action. There is never any necessary correlation between seeing things from the Other’s point of view and also identifying in part or wholly or not (at all) with the Other. Every case depends on the actual situation of the I (ego) and Other, etc.. Role-taking/the assumption of roles is an inner reflective activity and non-binding, whereas role-playing has outer action characteristics too, which will be discussed also in the next sub-section in relation to G.H. Mead. The two levels of role-taking/the assumption and taking on/over of roles include role-taking/the assumption and taking on/over of roles, with the second level also being role-playing (outer behaviour or (rather) action). The scientific observer’s social-ontic level observes an I (ego) and an Other capable of role-taking and role-playing, which are absolutely essential for the social relation’s mechanism. Concrete interaction involving content, does not have the necessary commonality as to content which the form-related/formal aspect of the mechanism of the social relation has for both the I (ego) and the Other. Grosso modo, the relationship between the formal/form-related mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles, and the content of roles, is like the relationship between social ontology, and, sociology and history. Likewise, prognoses of concrete roles are no task of social ontology, but a matter for historical-psychological and sociological analysis. The omnipresent co-existence of both form-related and content-related levels of the mechanism of the social relation as it pertains to role-taking and role-playing, means that man is always both familiar and potentially strange, alien to man. Reference is made to the Great David Hume and the passions common to all humans. The I (ego) cannot know what the Other will do or what the Other is thinking or will not necessarily come to an agreement with the Other just because the I (ego) is aware that the Other has the same capacity for, and ability at, role-taking and role-playing as the I (ego). Moreover, consent is possible where there are misunderstandings, and dissent is possible when there is full understanding of the Other, etc.. Solipsism occurs when the I (ego) considers that the Other should select the same content as the I (ego), notwithstanding that the I (ego) realises that the Other has the same ability as the I (ego) at the assumption and taking on/over of roles etc.. When solipsism does not reach level of self-destruction, the extent it occurs is related to identity, which in turn, relates, inter alia, to orientation and (im)ponderability. No matter how ponderable the I (ego) wants the Other’s behaviour to be, and no matter to what extent the I (ego) assumes and takes on/over the Other’s perspective, “I did not expect that of him” is always an ever-present potential reality. There is no Covering Law Model. And the actual understanding of the Other as taking on/ over the Other’s perspective(s), role(s) is an ideal-type-like construct intersecting with a whole series about general human essence and behaviour, in any case. There is never any permanent, fixed certainty about the Other. Only a posteriori can we know, and “philosophers” can then very easily go about “selling their wares” in the marketplace of ideas. The mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and roles is formal, form-related, structural and common to everyone, whereas the (necessarily variable) typifications people use for understanding are content-related. For interaction to take place, the I (ego) must first form some kind of picture or image of the Other (“objective” or not, whether about the Other as a person as a whole or not). The discussion then shifts to the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which has to do with the aim of the interaction (in a broad sense) between the I (ego) and the Other and the construct of the Other as to the Other’s inner and outer state for the purposes of the I (ego) putting itself in the situation and position of the Other. In other words, the “true, objective, (in)complete” or otherwise picture of the Other is not of importance, but the picture – which is oriented towards the actual interaction of the actual social relation in question (including with regard to typifications involving deviations from accepted and or dominant norms and models of behaviour) – is what counts. Typifications are absolutely unavoidable during the unfolding of interaction, so all talk about “stereotypes” seems ludicrous when one considers that types are part of the way people perceive others and things, ANYWAY! Three possibilities are present in regard to the subjective perception and objective meaning: 1) when the I (ego) does not care what the Other objectively thinks and wants in regard to its action, and simply goes along with the Other’s projections, claims etc. (= the lobotomisation-point of the I (ego)); 2) the I (ego) goes along with the perspective of the Other, in order to know what the Other objectively wants by its actions; 3) the I (ego) just looks at the actions of the Other, and is not concerned with the Other’s motives and intentions. The power relationship becomes crucial in the third case, when the Other reacts adversely to the I (ego) not being interested in the Other’s intentions etc., and it is well known from courtly times of long ago how flattery etc. can operate to the comparative favour of the weaker side, given the (massive) power imbalance. A number of scenarios are presented regarding more or less symmetrical relations of power. Both sides taking into account the other’s perspective (a kind of ideal type of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) is no guarantee of itself for consensus, because the inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation can just as easily potentially be called into play when both sides “understand” each other etc..  The simultaneous development of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at a form-related (i.e. formal) and a content-related level procures for the actors a possibility, whose meaning for social life can hardly be overestimated: the possibility of suggestion and of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit). AND SO P.K. GOES INTO “I’M THE GREATEST THINKER OF ALL TIME” MODE FOR THE UMPTEENTH TIME AGAIN ... WHAT FOLLOWS ARE ABSOLUTELY STUNNING PASSAGES AND PARAGRAPHS ON BRAINWASHING AND LOBOTOMISATION, POWER, IDENTITY, ETC.. Here’s a further teaser: Since the I (ego) suggests to the Other a deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)), it guides the behaviour of the Other in such a way that now the appropriate reaction to the Other’s (re)action suggested by the deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)) is that action which the I (ego) in truth (i.e. in reality) intended, planned or aimed at. Also included, is discussion about affects, emotions and the reflectivity of thought. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is necessarily reflective, whereas the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is characterised by a possibly affect-laden (i.e. loaded-with-sentiments-and-emotions) narrowness or tightness. The latter situation, however, does not mean that the I (ego) will not be able to engage in the former assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. There is no such thing as a rationality which is free of emotions and “ethical”. Only a Satanic Circus Monkey Person in Western Mass Democracies, would ever claim so, in order to e.g. Obfuscate the Reality of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE accumulations, concentrations and crystallisations of forms of Power and Wealth including through Primitive Secret Society Networking (mafia-like behaviour of deceit and favouritism, nepotism, etc.) and centuries of elite-level involvement in Banking, Finance, International Trade and later Corporations. For these are the ZIO-SATANISTS, these are the ANIMALS from HELL. Differences in intellectual talent and available information and or the fact that aims are diametrically opposed affect neither the commonality of the mechanism of the social relation and the potential for deception, deceit, etc.. What matters is the broader framework of power relations, and not necessarily if one side is actually more intellectually talented and better informed than the other side. Presenting interaction and interaction’s mechanism in terms of form (formalisation), invariably presume equal intellectual talent and equal access to information, as well as common and equal ethically loaded “rationality” etc. and thus create theories which end up being ideological and or utopistic, because they do not take into consideration the reality of (networks of) power relations and associated hierarchies, inequalities, power relations’ complexities, and social-ontological/anthropological constants. [[That is why before ZIO-USA proper, we have the groundwork laid by the Protestants and others, such as Dewey, Pierce, James, Royce, Cooley and G.H. Mead (Blumer, W.I. Thomas, R.E. Park) as reflecting nascent mass-democratic ideology (it’s not just the JOO, Boas!), culminating in Parsons, before the ZIO-Excrement take over in academia, esp. from the 1960s (and hence the understandable but futile reactions of Revilo Oliver to the Primitive Secret Society ZIO-Excrement; especially because at the business/Big Money level, Henry Ford reacted first (all to no avail) and a great sociologist like Sombart “got shafted and conveniently forgotten about”, whilst even the nearly GREATEST OF ALL TIME, Max Weber, got “sidelined” compared to a total JOO NINCOMPOOP like Derri-JOO-DA (JOO, ZIO, SATANIC EXCEMENT-FILTH), though Goffman (like Arendt and N. Elias) obviously has some not inconsiderable value, as e.g. does Morgenthau, ... AND ... not to mention Wagner being deemed “naughty” for simply speaking TRUTHS about the ZIO-Excrement ... (there is a clear reason why Schmitt and Heidegger were “silent” because before Hitler’s reign the SATANIC-HEBROO-ZIO-JOO-FILTH WERE GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY (INCL. THROUGH PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING ETC.) INVOLVED AT ELITE LEVELS OF GERMAN SOCIETY (FROM BANKING AND FINANCE, TO THE MASS MEDIA, ACADEMIA, THE LAW AND “ENTERTAINMENT”) ... AND P.K.s GREAT TEACHERS with WHOM HE HAD PERSONAL INTERACTION WITH, KNEW THIS VERY WELL = BRUNNER, CONZE (WHO WROTE EXTENSIVELY ABOUT THE ZIO EXCREMENT), KOSELLECK, ARNDT ... Hitler, of course, Literally went Bananas and became Satanic himself ... whereas Stalin and MAO knew they had to “shut the whole shop” and KEEP THE ZIO-EXCREMENT-MAMMON SCUM OUT. Deng, seeing that the Soviet Union could not “handle it” any more, had a Dream, and “played along” with the ZIO-Excrement and their MAMMON-Protestant, Cock-Sucking and Papist EVIL-DEVIL Satanist Partners, only though to Attempt to DO what no other Third-Worlder had ever previously managed to achieve (from Egypt’s Mohomut Mohomut c. 1800 to the Japs c. 1900-1945) i.e. to OverTurn Western Domination on the White-Devil Man’s (Industrial/Military Might and Power) Terms. The White-Devil Man, of course, included the ZIO-JOO-HEBROO-I WANT TO BE SICK-VOMIT-ULTRA UGLY-DEVIL-EVIL-EVIL-DEVIL-SATANIC-LUCIFER-PARASITIC-FLEA-LEECH-VULTURE-POO-FAECES-DUNG-EXCREMENT-JUDAS-MAMMON MAN, and Han Man knows THAT (Hindu Man knows it TOO, but Hindu Man FLOATS TOO MUCH and hasn’t yet even taken Historical Revenge on the Muhumuts for all they DID to Hinduism (and Buddhism) over the Centuries)). Anyway, From the Age of Satan (Joos, Femino-Faggots, Negro Worship, Otherisation, Circusisation, Freakification etc., etc., etc., under Uproot-De-Root, preceded by all the many decades and centuries of the Up-Root/De-Root Massification, Atomisation, Industrialisation, Secularisation, Urbanisation, etc. etc., etc.), ... to the Age of the Ape ... that’s the way it’s going...]] So, apart from G.H. Mead’s social psychology and interactionism (as well as formalisation at the service of ethics), in the USA, there was also mathematically-inspired game theory, in terms of major attempts at theorising the social relation. (Goffman, inter alia, nuanced Mead’s formalistic approach, and game theory was less “ethicising” since it focused on strategic and power/ technical matters, but could never ever secure “certainty” of outcome, and was thus ultimately theoretically redundant because many decades beforehand the Great Clausewitz pointed out the necessity of “tact of judgement”, which can never by surpassed as a concept for understanding the ultimate openness of human existence and many concrete situations (interrelations and interactions). Game theory, however, should be acknowledged for acknowledging the reality of deception and deceit in interaction, as well as the three basic possibilities of: pure conflict; pure co-ordination; mixture of conflict and interdependence). The inner mechanism of the social relation (the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) can unfold and develop only against the background of the spectrum of the social relation, and such unfolding and development is potentially open to all kinds of positionings and interpretations of signs and symbolism and language exchanged within the spectrum of the social relation, depending every time, on the concrete situation. Symbolic interactionism was able to ascertain the importance of interpretation, something lacking in structuralistic approaches, system theories and role theories. However, symbolic interactionism only did, as it were, “half of the job”, because it lacked awareness of the social relation’s spectrum’s polarity, continuity and effect on perspective-taking and the mechanism of the social relation. This, in turn, was due to e.g. Mead’s student Blumer not letting go of strong ethical proclivities, so that (extreme) enmity was given a lesser stature than what it should have in theoretical contemplation, including post-WW2 (see discussion in Ch. III, incl. references to many Joos like Lipset, Gurvitch, Schütz and Leo Strauss). Interactionist(ic) social psychologists did not come to grips with the realities of power relations affecting interaction, and hence tended towards idealistic theoretical models emphasising consensus, when conflict has never, and will never, disappear (cf. Scheff, Homans). Theoretical errors take place when the interests and aims of actors (and possible consensus or dissent) are confused with the mutual assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Shibutani). Social-psychologically (and social-ontologically), there is no structural difference between actors, who behave in conformity with norms, and such actors who ignore or ride roughshod over norms. R. Turner saw that there is no general principle of norm conformity. A real sociologist worthy of the name “sociologist” like Norbert Elias (Joo), was fully aware of the co-existence of enmity, along with friendship, and from a real sociologist like N. Elias, we get to an “all-time” great and theoretician of enmity: the one and only Machiavelli, incl. in relation to perspective-taking, deception and deceit. The Other as foe should never be underestimated because he has all the social-ontological and anthropological potential ability at “rationality” as perspective-taking and capacity for deceit as the I (ego). There is a pertinent reference to the hunt/chase as being potentially life-threatening when the I (ego) is not able to assume and take on/over the perspective of the Other as hunter. There is also reference to Clausewitz’s notion of interaction (mutual influence) and how one is not master of oneself without defeating one’s foe. ... The spiral of enmity heightens and intensifies precisely due to the fact that both foes put themselves in the situation and position – at ever higher tiers, levels, stages or grades – of the other (side) on each and every respective occasion. ... Likewise, with friendship. P.K. then goes through a number of basic examples of perspective-taking and friendly and inimical relations. Confusion surrounding sociality and socialisation, and the confusing of consensus related to content(s) with consensus related to expectations, are also pointed out. Enmity and struggle are just like friendship, social. There is no sociality and socialisation which only relates to norm conformity, as ethicists would have it. Because there actually is the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, there cannot be just norm conformity. There will be norm non-conformity too. The Other has a psyche of his own.






Chapter IV, sub-section 1Cc, “The George Herbert Mead sub-section”, is not only fascinating in relation to the (vacillating, wavering) battle of notions, aims and conceptualisations in (the (almost) Great) Mead’s thinking, particularly between the Desire for Scientific Observation (Description and Explanation), and, the Desire for “Democracy and Equality”, including in relation to the Mechanism of the Assumption and Taking On/Over of Perspectives, Communication, the Friend-Foe Spectrum of the Social Relation, (Im)Ponderability and Identity, etc. ... without ever Coming to Grips with (Explaining Group and Individual) Power ImBalances etc., ... so that it becomes apparent that for the Satanists (Da Joos and their (FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA LOBOTMISED) allies) to be able to GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY take over American and then Western High Theory (including through their Satanic Circus Monkey Primitive Secret Society Networking (i.e. the Satanism of JUDAS and MAMMON)), the GroundWork had been very Thoroughly Laid by the Protestant-Papist-Secularist-Atheists in General, with G.H. Mead representing one of the High Points of American Theory and its Programmatic Mixing of Scientific Intent with Normative-Ethical Concerns. [[The United States of America, both in terms of Overall Political and Economic Development (“Democratic Populism” and the Rise of Corporations (JOOporations)), along with the anti-European, anti-oligarchic bourgeois Ethos and Ideology of “Democratic Equality”, was the Perfect Staging Ground for The Representatives of Satan (The Extremely Satanic Hate Tribe of JUDAS and MAMMON) to play GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE roles in and at all Elite Facets and Levels of Society, from Banking, High Finance and International Trade (where the Satanist Mammonist Tribal JUDAS DEVIL-EVIL-EVIL-DEVIL Extremists had centuries of Experience in Europe) to Mass Media, Mass Entertainment, Academia, Government Policy, “Education”, BrainWashing, Full-Spectrum ZIO-USA Lobotomisation, etc., ensuring that the West would SPIN ITS OWN SELF OUT OF CONTROL AND INTO AUTO-GENOCIDAL NON-EXISTENCE by about c. 2100. A Job Very Well Done. Here, Give YourSelves a PRIZE! (The Only Consolation for the NON-Satanists of European Origin Left, is that Han Man and or Ape Man and or Another Man is going to eventually have to DEEP FRY ALL OF THEM, BECAUSE NO-ONE CAN STAND THEM ONCE ONE GETS PAST BEING HYPNOTISED AND BRAIN-WASHED BY THEM OR SIMPLY DOES NOT WANT TO CO-OPERATE WITH THEM MAMMONISTICALLY-JUDASISTICALLY-SATANISTICALLY IN TERMS OF THEIR EXTREMIST ZIO EXCREMENTAL UNENDING EVIL HATE WITH ALL THEIR DISGUSTING GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE MANIFESTATIONS OF FORMS OF POWER AND WEALTH, INCLUDING THE RIDICULOUS OVER-PROJECTION OF THE ZIOCAUST, WHEN MORE THAN 250 (TWO-HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLION) INNOCENTS DIED IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, INCLUDING TENS AND TENS AND TENS OF MILLIONS OF ORTHODOX BROTHERS AND SISTERS AND DESCENDENTS THEREOF AND OTHER RELATIVELY WHITE CHRISTIANS AND OR ATHEISTS, NOT TO MENTION ALL THE ASIANS, LATINOS, AFRICANS (KAFFIRS) ET AL.).]] References are also made to W. James, H. Bergson, M. Scheler, the great É. Durkheim (LEGEND and HONOURARY JOO), W. McDougall, and J. B. Watson. The discussion turns to the “I”, which the “Me” of norms and collective human-social existence does not seem to be able to, as it were, “fix”, on an absolute and permanent basis. Mead reaches the point of describing the “I’s” assumption of the assumption of perspectives of the “Me”, but does not describe the full implications of such a state of affairs for the social relation as a social-ontological/anthropological magnitude. Mead is most interested in the “Me” giving the “I” an “objective” point of orientation (i.e. he predates all the ZIO(/USA)-Excrement (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste) and their Allies in producing “theory” and in engaging in various forms of thought control and brain washing (which mutatis mutandis, all societies DO – one way or another, in any event and anyway). Mead does not see or does not want to grapple with the fact that not only the “I” differs from person to person, but also the “I’s” construction and or perception of the “Me” also (potentially) differs. Mead’s schema has the “Me” as untouched by the fluctuations in the way(s) the “I” sees itself. P.K. goes on to make the extremely important point that notions such as “good manners”, “equality”, “human dignity” (I add: “racism”, “sexism”, “-phobia this”, “anti-that” etc.) are all contingent on what content arises from the concrete situation of interactions between “I” and “relevant Others” etc.. Mead also assumes a “normality” and a “rationality” and a complying with norms as regards fundamentals in “civilised life”, which “just happens”, because there is no other way to extract an Ought from the Is of the “generalised Other”. [[All of this produces a strong ideological backdrop for ZIO-USA, which the ZIO-Excrement and their allies will pounce upon once they get into GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE positions of elite-level power and wealth in their in-part GROSSLY DISPROPOTIONATE takeover of the USA and thereafter leading all of the rest of the West into AUTO-GENOCIDE AND MASS AUTO-SUICIDE. This could only be possible in circumstances of the aftereffects of the two world wars, Konsum, Hedonismus, Toleranz, Kelsen-Popper Satanic Multi-Kulti Open Society, Pluralismus etc. and the FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO/USA lobotomy with the ABSOLUTELY DISGUSTING GROSS OVER-PROJECTION OF THE ZIOCAUST, AS IF THE DEATH OF SIX (6) MILLION PIECES OF ZIO-FILTH-POO-FAECES-DUNG-RAT-VERMIN-PARASITIC-FLEA-VULTURE-FAECES- CANCER COULD MEAN ANYTHING WHEN COMPARED TO THE DEATH OF ONE GREEK (HELLENE, ROMAN), LET ALONE TENS AND TENS AND TENS OF MILLIONS OF ORTHODOX BROTHERS AND SISTERS (RUSSIANS, SERBIANS, ET AL.), AND DESCENDANTS THEREOF, NOT TO MENTION ALL THE OTHER TENS AND TENS AND TENS OF MILLIONS OF WHITE CHRISTIANS, WHITE ATHEISTS (INCLDUING GERMAN HUN KRAUT TEUTONS), AND ALL THE YELLOWS, BROWNS, MIXED AND BLACKS (KAFFIRS), NUMBERING IN TOTAL MORE THAN 200 OR 250 MILLION HUMAN BEINGS (TWO HUNDRED OR TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLION) DEAD IN THE 20TH CENTURY, WHO APPARENTLY ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE THE SAME “INHERENT HUMAN VALUE” AS A ZIO-SCUMBAG (JOO, HEBROO PIECE OF MAMMON-SATAN-ULTRA-VILE-VOMIT-POO), WHO CLAIM ARE “SPECIAL” AND “CHOSEN”, WHILST PROMOTING THE SATANIC IDEOLOGY OF EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE FORMS OF ZIO-JOO-HEBROO-MAMMON-SATANIC-ELITE POWER AND WEALTH IN CERTAIN “WESTERN” COUNTRIES. ALL OF THIS COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED WITHOUT THE PROTESTANTS, THE PAPISTS, THE ATHEISTS AND THE COCK-SUCKERS GETTING ON BOARD THE MAMMON-SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY UP-ROOT, DE-ROOT ZIO-USA, ZIO-UK, ZIO-FRANCE, ZIO-GERMANY, ZIO-RUSSIA TRAIN, LEADING THE WEST TO ITS PATHETIC JUNGLE APE MAN END BY c. 2100.]] So, Mead ends up “in a pickle”, because his “generalised Other” assuming certain content cannot theoretically adequately cover cases of e.g. the charismatic dictator, collective psychosis, the invocation of (the religion) of “rationality”, the revolutionary party, the heretical sect, the fiery prophet, the afterworld etc.. The “Me” can only say on a scientific basis that there will be social norms, not what these social norms must be. “When the voice of the generalised Other is internalised in the sense of this form-related (i.e. formal) That, then the renegade or apostate “I” feels, precisely by invoking the “Me”, responsible and in a position to determine the What based on its own power (i.e. without anyone’s permission, or, just like that), and at the same time in fact, having a clear conscience for his part.” [[AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]] Mead does not go into the need for a stable identity able to play a number of different roles in regard to different people and or situations, and that is related to his downplaying of the “I” vis-à-vis the “Me”. “This partly unclear, partly weak status of the “I” comes or stems, though, from Mead’s decision to tackle and solve the problem of identity in accordance with an ethically-normatively inspired paedogogics of socialisation” (so it’s quite clear here, that the non-ZIO, of Protestant-Papist-Secular-Atheist origin, Americans, like G.H. Mead, paved the way with their Americano-centric “Democratic” “Equality” ideology for all the ZIO-Excrement and their allies to later feed off in terms of the production of mass-democratic ideology and FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA LOBOTOMISATION). Mead’s thinking leads to notions of a homogenised society of like-minded individuals with similar fundamental ethics, however, Mead was also not so naive as to believe there was no individuality in the real world, though he did want such individuality to be functionally beneficial for society. Thus, the ultimate logical consequences of Mead’s thought came into conflict with his ethical sympathies. RE: THE ISSUE OF “EQUALITY” GENERALLY, THIS IS VERY INTERESTING, ISN’T IT? “Mead himself stresses, incidentally, what significance and meaning for the “realisation” of identity, the striving to occupy certain positions inside of groups has – and behind this striving stands the “feeling” or perhaps the “to everyone, common conviction” that “we are basically better than other men”, as well as the “demand for one’s own identity to be realised by some kind of superiority over fellow men surrounding us”; this demand is “constant”, that is, obviously ineradicable and simultaneously regrettable and morally reprehensible. (The feeling of superiority steps backwards and recedes in situations in which the continuing existence and survival of the individual depends on the group). If that is so, then society consists inevitably and always of “narrowed and constricted” identities, and only of such identities.” Like the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, socialisation has its form-related/formal level and content-related level, which do not have to coincide (and that applies to relatively undifferentiated “sect-like” groups/societies). Or in other words, the generalised “Me” cannot always equally socialise all “I’s”. Hence, at the form-related level, socialisation concerns individuals “knowing what to say and do” (regardless of ethical content), whereas at the ethical or ethics-related level, different societies produce varying models of what “should be said and done” (as to specific, concrete ethical content). But once someone is “socialised” in a particular society, it’s just as possible for the veneer of socialisation to be used as a means to circumvent, undermine or otherwise certain societal norms (i.e. the “Me” is transformed into the servant of the “I”). Whilst normatively sanctioned equilibria are possible in a society, Mead’s conceptual instruments are neither consistently nor comprehensively sufficient in order to satisfy social-ontological claims. Mead’s social psychology was disseminated and found supporters precisely because of it’s ethically-normatively determined one-sidedness and ambiguity [[and I add: Mead’s social psychology (in part in contrast to the (more interpretive than normative) succeeding symbolic interactionism of incl. Mead’s students and followers e.g. Blumer against behaviourism/Watson (but also against the weakness of (more normative than interpretive) Parsonian(-like) interaction cum systems theory (also succeeding Mead)), who did go further than Mead’s social (not narrow/ Watsonian) behaviourism, but also did not fully realise that the social relation (constitutively) has just as much as its mechanism, its (Friend-Foe) spectrum as well – though Mead definitely displayed awareness of enmity existing as well as friendship constitutively in society, notwithstanding his hope in “evolution” bettering the human condition etc.) ... constituted the perfect ideological-quasi-scientific “radical/mass-democratic” building block (along with Kelsen and Popper (and Boas), and later the mostly ZIO-“Frankfurt School” (cum “communication”), and the system(s) and interaction of Parsons (though Parsons still remained, like G. H. Mead (and Cooley), something of a theoretical high point of American social theory)) for mainstream Protestant/Papist/Atheist- and then ZIO-USA (mass/radical-)democratic “equality” ideology (as opposed to the “invisible hand” and the ethical insight into/understanding of the autonomous individual Reason of (oligarchic bourgeois or classical) liberalism, which was then from the 1960s/1970s supplemented by The Absolutely Demented Inanity of Jew-RriDa and Joo-Cault (even though Joo-Cault had some strengths, too) ... to lead what remained of The West to Complete Self-Effacing, Mass Auto-Lobotomisation and Auto-Genocide (at the level of ideas, interacting with the level of broader social-economic (inter)action). If I were Han Man and or Ape Man, I’d just KEEP CALM and Wait for when The Time is RIPE. A Matter of Time (50, 100, 150, 500 years ... whatever ... (I don’t think, though, it’s going to be 500 years)) ...]]  

Make a free website with Yola